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Alternate Judges as Sine Qua
Nons for International Criminal
Trials
Megan A. Fairlie*

"[A]ny trials to which lawyers worthy of their calling lend themselves
will be trials in fact, not merely trials in name, to ratify a
predetermined result."
-Justice Robert H. Jackson, April 13, 1945'

ABSTRACT

When one of the three judges hearing the case against
Vojislav gedelj at the International Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) was disqualified during the deliberations
phase of the prosecution, many observers assumed that the
multi-year trial would have to be re-heard. Instead, the ICTY
opted to begin deliberations anew once a judge-who had not
spent a single day participating in the proceeding-had
familiarized himself with the trial record. This Article
demonstrates why the plan to proceed with a new judge in
e§elj's case was both procedurally illegitimate and markedly at
odds with the ICTY's statutory guarantee of a fair trial. It also
explains how ICTY proceedings came to be rendered vulnerable
to the havoc created when a judge is lost mid-trial and considers
how to mitigate the damage the Sedelj decision has wrought
upon the reputation of the ICTY. Finally, this Article illustrates
how the InternationalCriminal Court is currently destined for
its own Selelj moment and contends that the proper way
forward is through the liberal designationof alternatejudges.

* Associate Professor of Law, Florida International University College of Law. The
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ROBERT E. CONOT, JUSTICE AT NUREMBERG 14 (1983) (quoting Nuremberg
Prosecutor Robert Jackson).
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I. INTRODUCTION

For well over a year, Vojislav Segelj's prosecution for war crimes
and crimes against humanity at the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia 2 (ICTY) has been on hold. The delay is
designed to allow replacement Judge Mandiaye Niang time to
"familiarise himself' with the record of Segelj's more than four-year
trial. Although Niang was not present for a single day of the egelj
proceedings, the plan is for him to ultimately form part of the three-

2.
See U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to
Paragraph2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), 1 26, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/25704
(May 3, 1993), available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%2OLibrary/Statute/statute
re808_1993_en.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZHZ8-GH4P) (archived Oct. 5, 2014) [hereinafter
ICTY statute].
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judge panel that determines whether Segelj should be convicted of
serious violations of international humanitarian law.3
This
Article
examines
the
procedural
legitimacy-or
illegitimacy-of the decision to continue Se~elj's case with a
replacement judge and argues that the assignment of Niang to the
Segelj case conflicts with the ICTY's statutory guarantee of a fair trial
before three independent judges. In so doing, it illustrates how the
rights of accused persons at the ICTY and its sister tribunal, the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 4 (ICTR), have been
incrementally sidelined in order to avoid costly and time-consuming
re-trials. Establishing the significant harm that the Segelj matter has
wrought upon the ICTY's reputation, this Article then considers the
steps that the Mechanism for the International Criminal Tribunals 5
(MICT)-the ICTY and ICTR's successor tribunal-should take to
mitigate the damage wrought in Seelj. This Article then concludes by
demonstrating how ICTY and ICTR precedent in general and the
Sedelj debacle, in particular, should serve as a cautionary tale for the
International Criminal Court6 (ICC).

II. BACKGROUND

Vojislav Segelj's prosecution for instigating war crimes and
crimes against humanity7 began on November 7, 2007 before ICTY
Judges Antonetti, Harhoff, and Lattanzi. 8 This three-judge panel,

3.
See Prosecutor v. Se~elj, Case No. IT-03-67-T, Decision on Continuation of
Proceedings, ¶¶ 51, 53-55 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 13, 2013)
[hereinafter Se~elj Continuation Decision] (ordering the continuation of proceedings as
soon as Judge Niang familiarizes himself with the record).
4.
See generally S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S[RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994)
[hereinafter ICTR Statute] (adopting the Statute of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda, which established the ICTR).
5.
See generally Statute of the InternationalResidual Mechanism for Criminal
Tribunals S.C. Res. 1966, Annex 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1966 (Dec. 22, 2010) [hereinafter
MICT statute] (establishing the MICT).
6.
Created pursuant to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
art. 1, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
7.
See generally Prosecutor v. egelj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Second Amended
Indictment (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 25, 2007) (outlining the
charges against Segelj).
8.
See Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Fifteenth Annual Rep. of
the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the
Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, 1 55, U.N. Doc. A/63/210-S/2008/515 (Aug. 4, 2008)
[hereinafter 15th Annual Report]. More specifically, the trial "began anew" on this
date. See id. Earlier trial proceedings came to a halt when Segelj initiated a hunger
strike designed to get the Tribunal to meet certain demands, including acceptance of
his pro se representation. See, e.g., Marlise Simons, Serb Nationalist'sTrial Begins in
The Hague, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/08/world/
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tasked to determine egelj's criminal responsibility, presided over the
courtroom proceedings until their conclusion on March 20, 2012.9
Deliberations began quickly after closing arguments were heard.' 0 By
the time of the deliberations stage, the trial's record consisted of more
than 17,000 pages of transcript, nearly 1,400 admitted exhibits, and
over 500 submissions made by the accused." More than a year later,
the ICTY President announced that the Trial Chamber would render
its judgment in October 2013.12
Just days after that plan was made public, however, a
controversial personal email from Judge Harhoff surfaced. The
correspondence criticized the ICTY President and then-recent
acquittals at the ICTY.13 The revelation prompted Segelj to move for
Harhoff's exclusion from the trial panel. Harhoff's subsequent
disqualification for an unacceptable appearance of bias,1 4 the first of
its kind at the ICTY,' 5 left uncertainty in its wake. Shortly after the
europe/08hague.html?-r=1& (subscription required) [http://perma.cc/9AEX-MGY9]
(archived Sept. 28, 2014) (explaining that the trial was stopped due to a 28-day hunger
strike to push various demands, several of which were met).
9.
See Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Nineteenth Annual Rep. of
the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the
Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, 1 54, U.N. Doc. A/67/214-S/2012/592 (Aug. 1, 2012)
[hereinafter 19th Annual Report] (indicating that Judges Antonetti, Harhoff, and
Lattanzi presided over the courtroom proceedings in Segelj's prosecution from
November 2007 until March 2012).
10.
Some three months later, the ICTY President reported that eielj's
"judgement is being prepared." See id.
11.
See Segelj Continuation Decision, supra note 3, at 29.
12.
See, e.g., Theodor Meron, ICTY President, Remarks at the 6977th mtg. of
the U.N.S.C., at 4, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6977 (June 12, 2013), available at http://
www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cfl%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF
9%7D/spv_6977.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZV5W-8X5G] (archived Sept. 28, 2014) ("The
Trial Chambers has now scheduled delivery of the judgment in this case for 30 October
2013 .... ). President Meron acknowledged that the date for judgment delivery had
been pushed back some three months because of the judges' involvement in other cases
and the loss of senior staff at the Tribunal. See id.
13.
See, e.g., Marlise Simons, Judge at War Crimes Tribunal FaultsAcquittals
of Serb and Croat Commanders, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2013, at A4, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/15/world/europe/judge-at-war-crimes-tribunal-faultsacquittals-of-serb-and-croat-commanders.html?_r=0
(subscription required) [http://
perma.cc/APH4-LWVB] (archived Sept. 28, 2014) (raising serious questions about the
credibility of the court).
14.
See Prosecutor v. Seielj, Case No. IT-03-67-T, Decision on Defence Motion
for Disqualification of Judge Frederik Harhoff and Report to the Vice-President, ¶ 14
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 28, 2013) [hereinafter Harhoff
Disqualification decision] ("Accordingly, the Majority finds that the allegation of bias
against Judge Harhoff is founded.").
15.
Despite countless, accused-engineered motions, no ICTY judge had ever
been disqualified from hearing a prosecution for serious violations of international
humanitarian law prior to the Seielj decision. In fact, the only successful
disqualification motion in the ICTY's history was made prior to the commencement of a
contempt proceeding against a former Tribunal employee. See In the Case against
Florence Hartmann, Case No. IT-02-54-R77.5, Report of Decision on Defence Motion for
Disqualification of Two Members of the Trial Chamber and of Senior Legal Officer,
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disqualification, the ICTY's spokesperson admitted, "[w]e're not
completely sure what will happen" and acknowledged that the ICTY's
6
rules needed to be consulted.'
What the ICTY ought to have done was engage in a careful
analysis of the relevant rules of procedure, consider the rules'
development and application over time, and pay particular attention
to their express procedural protections. Proceeding in this way would
have been transparent and predictable. It would also have had the
added benefit of drawing from ICTY experience, including the product
of multiple judicial plenaries that previously considered and
addressed the fairness implications created by losing a judge midtrial. Instead, Segelj's newly constituted Trial Chamber charted a
different course by issuing a decision that concludes, after four brief
paragraphs that make no reference to the rules, "that the assignment
of [a new judge] does not represent an obstacle to the continuation of
proceedings."' 7
Fallout from the ruling was swift and well-deserved. Lending
credence to longstanding Serbian suspicion of the ICTY,1 8 the thinlyreasoned opinion prompted speculation that it was little more than a
preordained decision to proceed to a predetermined conviction. 19

¶

55(a)(ii) (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 27, 2009), available at
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/contempt_hartmann/tdec/en/090327.pdf.
16.
Agence France-Presse, Yugoslav War Crimes Court Removes Judge over
'Bias', GLOBAL POST (Aug. 29, 2013, 7:46 AM), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/
[http://perma.ccl
news/afp/130829/yugoslav-war-crimes-court-removes-judge-over-bias
8AS2-H3CKI (archived Oct. 22, 2014). Tribunal observers seemed similarly uncertain
as to what process was required under the rules. See, e.g., Marko Milanovic, Breaking:
Judge Harhoff Disqualified from the Seselj Case, EJIL: TALK! (Aug. 28, 2013),
http://www.ejiltalk.org/breaking-judge-harhoff-disqualified-from-the-seselj-case/ [http://
perma.cc/P3C4-RWPB] (archived Sept. 28, 2014) (concluding that the case "is probably
going bust" and opining that Rule 15 bis might be applied by analogy); see also Marko
Prelec, Comment to Breaking: Judge Harhoff Disqualified from the Seselj Case, EJIL:
TALK! (Aug. 29, 2013, 10:21 AM) (contending that the rules permit unfettered
continuation of the proceedings with a new judge).
17.
Segelj Continuation Decision, supra note 3, T 55.
18.
See, e.g., Zorana Suvakovic, The Politics of Justice at The Hague, ALJAZEERA (Jan. 28, 2014, 9:19 AM), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/01/
politics-justice-at-hague-2014121141359532592.htm [http://perma.ccrD8UE-FUTS] (archived
Sept. 28, 2014) (noting the Serbian public's "very negative view" of the ICTY and
implicitly endorsing the argument that it would be "impossible for a new judge without
any experience whatsoever at the Hague Tribunal to catch up with seven years of
proceedings and review the numerous documents that were produced during the trial
and be able to decide on a verdict"). On the persistently negative public view of the
ICTY in Serbia, with accompanying data, see Mirko Klarin, The Impact of the ICTY
Trials on Public Opinion in the Former Yugoslavia, 7 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 89, 92 (2009).
19.
See, e.g., William A. Schabas, edelj Gets a New Judge and Adds Another
Few Years to his Pre-TrialDetention, PHD STUDIES IN HUMAN RIGHTS (Dec. 18, 2013,
5:06 AM), http://humanrightsdoctorate.blogspot.com/2013/12/Seielj-gets-new-judge-andadds-another.html [http://perma.cc/3X4Q-45VP] (archived Sept. 28, 2014) [hereinafter
Schabas, edelj Gets a New Judge] (opining that the two remaining judges had decided
upon Segelj's guilt during the initial deliberations).
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Perhaps worse still, 20 the decision evoked powerful criticisms for its
failure to meaningfully honor the ICTY's requirement of a three-judge
22
trial panel,21 and its apparent disregard of the ICTY's rules.
In light of the recent confirmation of the ICTY's decision to
23
proceed with a new judge with little discussion on appeal, this
Article undertakes the procedural analysis that both the Trial and
Appeals Chambers failed to conduct by comprehensively evaluating
the relevant rules. In so doing, this Article considers and analyzes
pertinent case law from the ICTY and ICTR along with jurisprudence
from their shared Appeals Chamber 24 to remedy existing
misperceptions about the provisions relevant to Segelj's case.
By providing a broader perspective on the role of replacement
judges in international criminal justice, this Article's contribution
extends well beyond the egelj matter. Drawing upon the experience
of the post-WWII tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo, this Article
establishes that the initial failure of the UN Security Council to
provide for alternate ICTY judges was an unfortunate and avoidable
error. It then illustrates how the ICTY's attempt to compensate for
this shortcoming was initially robust, but regrettably short-lived.
Tracking the ICTY's approach to substitute judges throughout its
operation, this Article demonstrates how the history of replacement
judges at the ICTY reveals an increasing disregard for the rights of
the accused in favor of avoiding costly and time-consuming rehearings.
Highlighting the pressure the UN Security Council has
continuously placed upon the ICTY and ICTR to expedite their
proceedings, this Article argues that the costs of not providing for
alternate judges, exacted in terms of procedural fairness and the

20.
"Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe
its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
See Schabas, Segelj Gets a New Judge, supra note 19 ("Why not simply
21.
confer the gathering of evidence and the hearing of oral submissions by the parties to
one judge, putting everything on videotape. Then, when it is all finished, bring in a
couple of judges at the end to speed read everything and watch the You-Tube
proceedings?").
See, e.g., Kevin Jon Heller, The Final Nail in the ICTY's Coffin, OPINIO
22.
JURIS (Dec. 16, 2013, 6:37 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/12/16/final-nail-ictys-coffin/
[http://perma.cc/9KGJ-WCE3] (archived Sept. 28, 2014) ("[A]pplying the rule as written
would prevent Seselj from being convicted, so the Tribunal is simply ignoring what it
says.").
See Prosecutor v. Segelj, Case No. IT-03-67-AR15bis, Decision on Appeal
23.
against Decision on Continuation of Proceedings, 1 68 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia June 6, 2014) [hereinafter Segelj Appeal] (concluding, with limited analysis,
that neither the Statute nor the Rules prevented the Trial Chamber from exercising its
discretion and that there was no discernible error in the exercise of discretion).
See ICTR Statute, supra note 4, art. 12(2) ("The members of the Appeals
24.
Chamber of the International Tribunal for the . .. Former Yugoslavia . .. shall also

serve as the members of the Appeals Chamber of the International Tribunal for
Rwanda.").
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reputations of both tribunals, far exceed any money saved. As a
result, this Article contends that, as the successor court to the ICTY
and ICTR, the MICT would do well to learn from these mistakes and
can play a key role in remedying the legacy of the ICTY and ICTR.
The Article then illustrates how, given the opportunity, ICTY and
ICTR precedent could be powerfully instructive for the International
Criminal Court (ICC), an institution presently poised to follow their
destructive path.

III. THE OMISSION OF ALTERNATE JUDGES IN THE ICTY STATUTE

The 1993 statute that created the ICTY called for both threejudge fact-finding panels and a majority vote for convictions. 25 The
statute, however, did not include a provision for replacement or
alternate judges. This was a remarkable omission, particularly in
light of the practice of the two antecedents to the ICTY-the
International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg 26 and
International Military Tribunal for the Far East 27 (IMTFE) at
Tokyo-and the important role their precedent had on other aspects
of the ICTY's enabling statute.2 8 Indeed, because the IMT and IMTFE
embodied the only limited precedent from which the ICTY could
draw, 29 their experience with replacement judges ought to have been
recognized as remarkably instructive.

25.
See ICTY Statute, supra note 1, arts. 12, 23(2). The draft statute was
initially prepared by persons appointed under the Moscow Human Dimension
Mechanism of the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe. Several states
submitted additional draft proposals prior to the Secretary-General's submission of a
final version to the UNSC. See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 11-12 (4th ed. 2011).

26.
See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War
Criminals of the European Axis, U.S.-Fr.-U.K.-U.S.S.R., Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279
[hereinafter Nuremberg Charter], reprinted in VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P.
SCHARF, 2 AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 675, 677 (1995)

[hereinafter 2 MORRIS & SCHARF] (establishing the International Military Tribunal).
27.
See generally Proclamation by the Supreme Commander for the Allied
Powers, Jan. 19, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589 [hereinafter IMTFE Charter] (establishing the
IMTFE).
28.
In fact, the text of the Nuremberg Charter directly inspired certain other
aspects of the ICTY Statute. See, e.g., VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, 1 AN
INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 69 (1995) [hereinafter 1 MORRIS

& SCHARF] (arguing that the ICTY's Article 3 definition of the war crimes "is based
primarily on the relevant provisions of the Nuremberg Charter").
29.
Critically, both predecessor institutions were similarly constructed to the
ICTY. As discussed in greater detail below, all three institutions relied upon a judicial
panel to adjudicate criminal responsibility by a majority vote. In addition, all three
tribunals adopted adversarial construct of party-driven evidence combined with a more
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IMT convictions required a majority vote of a judicial panel of
four judges. 30 The IMT Charter expressly addressed the issue of
replacement judges, authorizing the replacement of a member of the
IMT "for reasons of health or for other good reasons."31 To that end,
each of the Four Powers-France, the Soviet Union, the United
Kingdom and the United States-appointed an alternate judge who
was expected to "be present at all sessions of the Tribunal." 32
Although no ordinary judge needed to be replaced during the eightmonth trial, the alternates "contributed greatly to both deliberations
and judgment writing."3 3
The IMTFE experience was different, but ought to have proved
equally (or perhaps more) informative for the drafting of the ICTY
statute. While the IMTFE Charter also required a majority vote for
convictions,34 it called for a judicial panel of between six and eleven
members, 35 made no reference to the replacement of judges, and did
not provide for alternates to attend the proceedings.3 6 Nevertheless, a
replacement judge ultimately joined the eleven-member panel after
more than seven weeks of testimony had been heard.3 7 In spite of a
protest from the defense that the mid-trial substitute "could not be
continental evidentiary approach through which judges freely evaluate evidence rather
than depend upon extensive admissibility rules. See, e.g., Megan Fairlie, The Marriage
of Common and Continental Law at the ICTY and its Progeny, Due Process Deficit, 4
INT'L CRIM. L. REV. 243, 260-62, 268, 281 (2004); see also Alex Whiting, The ICTY as a
Laboratory of International Criminal Procedure, in THE LEGACY OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 83, 89 (Bert Swart,

Alexander Zahar & Goran Sluiter eds., 2011) ("[T]o the extent that there was precedent
in the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals, that model too was decidedly adversarial, with
party-led investigations and submissions to the judges.").
30.
See Nuremberg Charter, supra note 26, art. 4(c).
31.
See id. art. 3. This provision, along with the above-mentioned requirement
of attendance for alternates, defies the argument that the existence of alternate judges
was a purely political maneuver.
32.
See id. art. 2. The politics inherent in the creation of the Charter required
the arguably inefficient appointment of four alternates as opposed to one; each of the
four nations wanted to ensure its own representation should the need for an alternate
arise. See Otto Triffterer, Article 74 Requirements for the Decision, in COMMENTARY ON
THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 953, 954, 960 (Otto

Triffterer ed., 1999) (noting that the four Allied powers each wanted to make sure that
each judge's incapacity would not change the composition of the Tribunal).
33.
Patricia M. Wald, Running the Trial of the Century: The Nuremberg Legacy,
27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1559, 1577 (2006).
34.
See IMTFE Charter, supra note 27, art. 4(b).
35.
See id. art. 2 ("The Tribunal shall consist of not less than six members nor
more than eleven members, appointed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied
Powers. . . .").
36.
Minear attributes this omission to the large size of the IMTFE bench. See
RICHARD H. MINEAR, VICTORS' JUSTICE: THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL 86 (1971).

37.
See Gordon Ireland, Uncommon Law in Martial Tokyo, in 4 YEARBOOK OF
WORLD AFFAIRS 54, 59 (George W. Keeton & Georg Schwarzenberger eds., 1950); see
also R. John Pritchard, The InternationalMilitary Tribunal for the Far East and its
Contemporary Resonance, 149 MIL. L. REV. 25, 27 (1995) [hereinafter Pritchard,
Contemporary Resonance] (noting that "one American judge resigned and another was
appointed to take his place" on the eleven member court).
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familiar with the record of the trial," 38 and although more than 2,300
pages of testimony had by then been taken, a majority of the IMTFE
justices voted to overrule the defense's objection to the new judge.39
As one of the IMTFE prosecutors later reported, the substitution was
not only "most objectionable," but also likely to damage the IMTFE's
legacy. 40
Based on the experiences of these post-WWII courts, logic
suggests that the enabling statute for the ICTY should have provided
for alternate judges. Indeed, not only did the Nuremberg alternates
actually improve the output of the IMT, but the mere act of
incorporating the judges enhanced the perceived fairness of the IMT
proceedings. 4 1 What is more, by the time the ICTY came about, it was
generally accepted that "Nuremberg [stood] out from a procedural
perspective as a relatively fair trial," 42 "[b]oth objectively, and in
contrast to its Tokyo counterpart." 43

38.
MINEAR, supra note 36, at 87.
39.
See Carrington Williams, The Tokyo War Crimes Trial before the
InternationalMilitary Tribunal for the Far East, in 1 INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW 105, 149 app. A (John Carey, William V. Dunlap & R. John Pritchard eds., 2003).
40.
According to the Associate Prosecutor from New Zealand, "'it would appear
most objectionable . .. that a new member should be appointed during the
trial. ...

There can be little doubt, I think, that the replacement . . . will provoke

strong criticism when jurists and others come to examine the proceedings of the
I.M.T.F.E."' DOCUMENTS ON THE TOKYO INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL: CHARTER,

INDICTMENT, AND JUDGMENTS Ivi (Neil Boister & Robert Cryer eds., 2008) [hereinafter
TOKYO DOCUMENTS] (footnote omitted) (quoting Brigadier R.H. Quilliam, Associate
Prosecutor for NZ, Jan. 29, 1948, Macmillan Brown Archives, 9).
41.
In the view of one commentator, providing "for alternate judges was only
reasonable and certainly preferable to the possibilities of starting the trial all over
again . . . [,] of introducing a new member in the course of the trial, or of continuing the
trial with a gradually dwindling bench." Georg Schwarzenberger, Judgment of
Nuremberg, 21 TUL. L. REV. 329, 335 (1947) (noting that the anticipated length of the
trial increased the likelihood of losing a member of the judicial panel); see also
Elizabeth Borgwardt, Re-Examining Nuremberg as a New Deal Institution: Politics,
Culture and the Limits of Law in Generating Human Rights Norms, 23 BERKELEY J.
INT'L L. 401, 457 (2005) (noting that an "important facet of the trial's rule of law legacy
was procedural" and that its components affected even "German defendants' own
evolving perception of this procedural fairness").
42.
M. Cherif Bassiouni, Remarks at the 80th Annual Meeting of the American
Society of International Law, in Forty Years After the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals:
The Impact of the War Crimes Trials on Internationaland National Law, 80 AM. Soc'Y
INT'L L. PROC. 56, 62 (1986); see Henry T. King, Jr., The Legacy of Nuremberg, 34 CASE
W. RES. J. INT'L L. 335, 339 (2002) ("By most accounts, the trial was fair and conducted
with objectivity .... ).
43.
See Bassiouni, supra note 42. "It must ... be noted that the Nuremberg
trial offered more guarantees of procedural fairness to the defendants [than the Tokyo
trial]." Id.; see also Leila Sadat Wexler, The Proposed Permanent International
Criminal Court: An Appraisal, 29 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 665, 673 n.46 (1996) (explaining
that IMT precedent is more valuable than that of the IMTFE, partially because of "the
perception that the Tokyo proceedings were substantially unfair to many of the
defendants").
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If anything, then, the IMTFE approach should have served as a
warning. As an initial matter, the failure of the Tokyo Charterwhich established the IMTFE-to provide for alternates was
consistent with its perceived procedural inferiority to that of the IMT.
This omission, coupled with the subsequent decision to allow a new,
unfamiliar judge to assume the bench during the proceedings
supported later critiques that the IMTFE proceedings were
"shamefully unfair and riddled procedurally."44 The Tokyo experience
also put the designers of the ICTY on notice of the very real
possibility of losing a judge during protracted proceedings. 4 5 Coupled
with the recognized need for the ICTY to incorporate the human
rights developments of the near half-century that followed the postWWII proceedings, 46 these observations ought to have mandated the
inclusion of a provision on alternate judges for the ICTY.
In fact, a Special Task Force of the American Bar Association
(ABA) recognized as much when it reviewed the ICTY 1993 enabling
act. The Task Force called upon the UN Security Council to
implement a "directive providing for the selection of two or more
alternate judges."47 As the ABA report rightly recognized, the ICTY
should provide "every reasonable structural and procedural
guarantee of impartiality," including the "safeguard" of alternate
judges. 48 Nevertheless, the ABA's call to the UN Security Council

44.
See Bassiouni, supra note 42, at 62. Warwick and Bassiouni conclude that
replacing judges mid-trial "creates grave problems of perceived injustice." Thomas S.
Warwick & M. Cherif Bassiouni, Organization of the International Criminal Court:
Administrative and Financial Issues, 25 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 333, ¶ 180 (1997)
(considering the possibility in the context of a then-proposed International Criminal
Court).

45.
Trial proceedings at IMTFE ran far longer than at the IMT, commencing in
May 1946 and concluding in April 1948. See Pritchard, Contemporary Resonance, supra
note 37, at 30-31. By the close of the case, the transcripts from the trial took up 48,412
pages. JOHN R. PRITCHARD, 2 THE TOKYO MAJOR WAR CRIMES TRIAL: THE RECORDS OF
THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST cxxxiii (1998). In the view

of IMTFE Judge R61ing, "the Tokyo Trial was far more difficult and complicated than
the Nuremberg one." B.V.A. ROLING & ANTONIO CASSESE, THE TOKYO TRIAL AND
BEYOND: REFLECTIONS OF A PEACEMONGER 87 (1993).

46.
See Neil J. Kritz, Coming to Terms with Atrocities: A Review of
Accountability Mechanisms for Mass Violations of Human Rights, 59 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 127, 130 (1996) (indicating that the ICTY and ICTR "rules of procedure
incorporate positive developments over the past fifty years with respect to the rights of
criminal defendants under international law"). These developments include the
recognition of the right to a fair trial as a human right. David Harris, The Right to a
Fair Trial as a Human Right, 16 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 352, 376-78 (1967).
47.
SPECIAL TASK FORCE OF THE ABA SECTION OF INT'L LAW & PRACTICE,
REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL TO ADJUDICATE WAR CRIMES COMMITTED IN

THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 22 (1993) [hereinafter ABA TASK FORCE REPORT] (adding
that the UNSC should also adopt a procedure for "select[ing] additional Trial Judges in
the event that Tribunal resources and the interests of justice so require").
48.
Id. at 23-24 (noting that this objective was particularly important because
of the ICTY's "important precedential value").
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went unanswered and, "probably for reasons of cost and efficiency," 49
no alternate judges were appointed. Indeed, costs for the new court
were kept down by allocating no more judges than were strictly
necessary to operate the ICTY's newly designated Trial and Appeals
Chambers. To that end, the statute remained unchanged, limiting the
total number of ICTY judges to eleven, 50 precisely the figure
necessary to run the ICTY's two Trial Chambers 5 ' and its fivemember Appeals Chamber.52
As a result, the statute creating the ICTY-like the one that
would be generated soon thereafter for the ICTR-not only failed to
provide for alternate judges but, assuming activity before each Trial
Chamber, precluded the possibility of existing judges serving as
alternates on an ad hoc basis. This, in turn, created a serious
challenge for the ICTY judiciary, who were then tasked with creating
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE) that would govern at the
ICTY5 3 and later at the ICTR. 54 In tackling the major assignment of
crafting the first comprehensive set of international rules of
procedure and evidence,5 5 the ICTY judges had to divine a way to

49.
Larry D. Johnson, Ten Years Later: Reflections on the Drafting, 2 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 368, 374 (2004); see also Michael P. Scharf, The Legacy of the Milosevic
Trial, in BRINGING POWER TO JUSTICE?: THE PROSPECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL

CRIMINAL COURT 25, 39 (Joanna Harrington, Michael Milde & Richard Vernon eds.,
2006) (criticizing the failure to provide for an alternate judge in the Milosevic
proceedings and concluding that this lacuna was attributable to the decision "to save
money"); William A. Schabas, The Influence of InternationalLaw and International
Tribunals on Harmonized or Hybrid Systems of Criminal Procedure, 4 WASH. U.
GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 651, 658 (2005) [hereinafter Schabas, Influence of International
Law] (surmising that the prospect of employing alternate judges had been thought of
but considered to be too expensive). The inference that the UNSC would have been
resistant to inflating the Tribunal's budget by providing for additional judges seems a
fair one to draw particularly because, at the time of its creation, "nobody really
believed that [the ICTY] would work." See Testimony of Madeleine K. Albright, in
Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, at 497, 507, Prosecutor v. Plavsic, Case No. IT-0039&40 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 2002) (noting that the
representatives to the UNSC at the time of the ICTY's creation actually believed there
would never be indictees, trials, or convictions).
50.
See ICTY Statute, supra note 2, art. 12.
51.
See id. art. 12(a).
52.
See id. art. 12(b).
53.
"The judges of the International Tribunal shall adopt rules of procedure
and evidence for the conduct of the pre-trial phase of the proceedings, trials and
appeals, the admission of evidence, the protection of victims and witnesses and other
appropriate matters." Id. art. 15.
54.
Pursuant to its Statute, the ICTR adopted, mutatis mutandis, the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence of the ICTY. See ICTR Statute, supra note 4, art. 14.
55.
The Nuremberg Rules of Procedure contained only eleven rules. See Rules
of Procedure of the International Military Tribunal, adopted Oct. 29, 1945, reprinted in
2 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 26, at 687. As a result, the precedential value of the
same has been noted to be "minimal." See Daniel D. Ntanda Nsereko, Rules of
Procedure and Evidence of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
5 CRIM. L.F. 507, 508 (1994). The ICTY Rules are "believed to be the first detailed
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preserve the statutory promise of a fair trial5 6 before independent5 7
and impartialse judges without the prospect of utilizing an alternate
judge.5 9

IV. REPLACEMENT JUDGES UNDER THE ICTY RULES
Remarkably, the first set of rules adopted by the ICTY judiciary
seemed to ably sidestep any fair trial concerns created by the absence
of judicial alternates. Specifically, Rule 15(E) of the RPE provided
that:
If a Judge is, for any reason, unable to continue sitting in a part-heard
case, the Presiding Judge may, if that inability seems likely to be of
short duration, adjourn the proceedings; otherwise he shall report to
the President who may assign another Judge to the case and order
either a rehearing or, with the consent of the accused, continuation of
60
the proceedings from that point.

Consistent with the ICTY Judges' "conscious effort to make good the
flaws of Nuremberg and Tokyo" through their drafting of the RPE, 6 1
this provision in 15(E) appeared to ensure that the unfortunate Tokyo
precedent would not be repeated at the ICTY. This distinction was of
critical importance, and not simply because the mid-trial replacement
of a judge over defense objection "did little to inspire confidence" in
the fairness of the Tokyo proceedings. 62 Of at least comparable

.

set ... ever to be drafted for an international criminal tribunal." Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia, Annual Rep. of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution
of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, Summary, U.N. Doc.
A/49/342-S/1994/1007 (Aug. 29, 1994) [hereinafter Annual Report].
56.
See ICTY Statute, supra note 2, art. 21(2) ("In the determination of charges
against him, the accused shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing . .
57.
See id. arts. 11(A)(1), 12.
58.
The Tribunal's judges "shall be persons of high moral character,
impartiality and integrity." Id. art. 13(1). ICTY jurisprudence makes clear that this is
more than a general prerequisite to judicial appointment, but required in concreto in
each proceeding. "[I]t is a fundamental right of all persons facing criminal charges to be
tried before an independent and impartial tribunal." Prosecutor v. Kordic & Cerkez,
Case No. IT-95-14/2, Bureau Decision (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May
4, 1998).
59.

See, e.g., MOHAMED SHAHABUDDEEN, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE AT

THE YUGOSLAV TRIBUNAL: A JUDGE'S RECOLLECTION 45 (2012) (noting that the rules
aimed to devise "a practical mechanism for achieving substantial justice in a situation
in which there was no provision for reserve judges").
60.
Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, R.15(E), U.N. Doc. IT/32 (Mar. 14, 1994) [hereinafter ICTY RPE].
61.
See Judge Antonio Cassese, President of the ICTY, Statement by the
President Made at a Briefing to Members of Diplomatic Missions, U.N. Doc. IT/29 (Feb.
24, 1994), reprinted in 2 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 26, at 649, 650.
62.
TOKYO DOCUMENTS, supra note 40, at lxi; see also Warwick & Bassiouni,
supra note 44, ¶ 180 ("[G]oing forward after replacing a judge with another judge who
has not heard the evidence and been able to form a first-hand opinion about the
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significance, the provision was notably consistent with the ICTY's
statutory guarantee of a fair trial. In seemingly every case, the

accused could require that his fate be decided by a judicial panel
whose members had been present for the entirety of the proceedings
against him, "[a]n essential guarantee of the proper administration of
justice and of the parties' rights." 63

Rule 15(E) empowered the accused to insist that only
knowledgeable fact-finders decide guilt. At the same time, by
requiring a rehearing whenever consent was withheld, Rule 15(E)
facilitated the ability of the replacement judge to become both
independent from-and on par with-the originally assigned judges.
Indeed, independence and equality are not simply desirable qualities
for a replacement judge. Rather, these qualities are critical to the

fact-finding advantage that the ICTY's three-judge trial panel was
designed to afford.6 4 In effect, by making a rehearing the default rule
in the absence of consent, Rule 15(E) preserved the newly constituted
panel's ability to serve as a procedural safeguard against erroneous
convictions. 65
To be sure, a verdict rendered by a three-judge panel can live up
to its designated aim of being more reliable than one delivered by a
single judge only if all three members are able to act independently.
In accordance with international human rights law, this, of course,
requires that the judges perform their roles free from external
political interference. 66 The enhanced ability of the panel to arrive at
credibility of the witness - creates grave problems of perceived injustice to one or both
sides in the trial.").
63.
Frank Terrier, The Procedure before the Trial Chamber, in 2 THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 1277, 1312-13

(Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta & John R.W.D. Jones eds., 2002) (describing the
importance of assuring the presence of every judge throughout each stage of the trial).
64.
"[T]he main way of reducing the luck involved in adjudication is to
establish large judicial panels." Menachem Mautner, Luck in the Courts,
9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 217, 224 (2007); see also Irene M. Ten Cate, International
Arbitrationand the Ends of Appellate Review, 44 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1109, 114344 (2012) (noting the "persistent belief that three judges are more likely to reach a
correct outcome than one").
65.
"The presence of three judges simultaneously receiving testimony,
observing witnesses, and deliberating and conferring before rendering a verdict in a
criminal case arguably presents strong protection against error or bias ..... Mark C.
Fleming, Appellate Review in the International Criminal Tribunals, 37 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 111, 114 (2001).
66.
This absolute and non-derogable right is memorialized in countless
international and regional instruments. See, e.g., Universal Islamic Declaration of
Human Rights art. V(a), adopted on Sept. 19, 1981, 21 Dhul Qaidah 1401 ("No person
shall be adjudged guilty of an offence . . . except after proof of his guilt before an
independent judicial tribunal."); African Charter on Human and People's Rights
art. 26, adopted on June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58 ("States parties to the present Charter
shall have the duty to guarantee the independence of the Courts."); International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), Annex, U.N. GAOR 21st
Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316, art. 14(1) (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976)
[hereinafter ICCPR] ("[E]veryone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a
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the right result, however, requires the additional ingredient of "intrajudicial independence."6 7 That is to say, the judges on the panel must
also be able to exercise their decision-making power without undue
influence from one another.6 8 Re-hearings foster this indispensable
type of independence. Equal access to all the relevant evidence
qualifies the new judge to formulate an autonomous opinion of all
evidence presented, and thereby enables the replacement to "make
69
proper findings without relying on the other two judges."
This, in turn, leaves a newly constituted panel capable of
engaging in the "collaborative juridical process that promotes
decisional accuracy." 70 Rather than suffer from an objective
inequality that makes him "reluctant to dissent from the views of the
other members of the panel,"7 1 presence throughout the rehearing
best empowers the new judge to engage effectively in deliberations. 72
By so fostering the capacity of the three judges to test and challenge

competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law."); American
Convention on Human Rights art. 8(1), Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter
ACHR] ("[E]very person has the right to a hearing ... by a competent, independent,
and impartial tribunal."); Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms art. 6(1), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, [hereinafter
European Convention] ("[E]veryone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.");
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
AJRES/217(III), art. 10 (Dec. 10, 1948) ("Everyone is entitled to all the rights and
freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such
as . . . political or other opinion . . . .").

67.
See Vicki C. Jackson, Judicial Independence: Structure, Context, Attitude,
in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN TRANSITION 19, 49 (Anja Seibert-Fohr ed., 2012); see
also Michael Solimine, Nepotism in the Federal Judiciary, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 563, 577
(2002) (suggesting that judges joining a panel "may be reluctant to dissent from the
views of the other members of the panel").
68.
See Megan A. Fairlie, Adding Fuel to Milosevic's Fire: How the Use of
Substitute Judges Discredits the UN War Crimes Tribunals, 16 CRIM. L.F. 107, 151-52
(2005).
69.
See Marlise Simons, Milosevic Judge Resigns Owing to Poor Health, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 23, 2004, at All (quoting a former ICTY official's concern that the then-tobe-appointed replacement in the Milosevic proceedings "risks not being an independent
judge"); see also Prosecutor v. Momcilo Krajisnik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, Decision
Pursuant to Rule 15 bis (D), ¶ 15 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 16,
2004) [hereinafter Krajisnik, Decision Pursuant to Rule 15 bis (D)] (accepting "that a
gap between the level of familiarity of the continuing judges and the substitute judge
remains, at least in theory" when a new judge joins the panel one-third of the way into
the prosecution's case).
70.
Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 232 (1991).
71.
Solimine, supra note 67, at 577.
72.
Admittedly, however, the new judge may not be poised to contribute as
effortlessly as his colleagues. See, e.g., Deborah H. Gruenfeld et al., Group Composition
and Decision Making: How Member Familiarity and Information Distribution Affect
Process and Performance, 67 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 1,
2-4 (1996) (outlining the difficulties that accompany being the new member in a
group).

2015]

ALTERNATE JUDGES AS SI NE QUA NONS FOR INTL CRIM. TRIALS

81

one another's theories as equals, the deliberative exercise becomes
more apt to bring about the right result.7 3

As initially adopted, Rule 15(E) likely reflected the collective
experience of the ICTY judges. As a foundational matter, the ICTY's
statutory requirement of a three-judge panel is consistent with the
notion, shared by common law and continental systems, that "three
heads are better than one." 74 In the U.S. appellate system, for
example, "the whole point of multimember panels is to increase the
possibility of reaching the 'correct' result."7 5 Comparably, in the

overwhelming majority of U.S. states, twelve-member juries are
required to prosecute more serious crimes, 76 consistent with the U.S.
Supreme Court's observation that "progressively smaller juries are
less likely to foster

effective

group

deliberation .

.

. lead[ing]

to

inaccurate fact-finding." 77 In parallel, continental systems employ a
panel of judges to adjudicate guilt when trying more serious
offences 78 in order to best ensure a just result.7 9

73.
"[Olur colleagues' reactions are a fine screen through which our actions are
filtered." Patricia M. Wald, Some Thoughts on Judging as Gleaned from One Hundred
Years of the Harvard Law Review and Other Great Books, 100 HARv. L. REV. 887, 906
(1987).
74.
See Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court
Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817, 847 (1994) (concluding that "collegial
deliberation ... adds to" what is otherwise a "purely numerical argument").
75.
Joshua A. Douglas, The Procedureof Election Law in Federal Courts, 2011
UTAH L. REV. 433, 483 (2011).
76.
"Only two states-Florida and Connecticut-rely on six-person juries in
serious felony prosecutions." Alisa Smith & Michael J. Saks, The Case for Overturning
Williams v. Florida and the Six-Person Jury: History, Law, and Empirical Evidence,
60 FLA. L. REV. 441, 442 (2008); see also Adam M. Chud & Michael L. Berman, Six
Member Juries: Does Size Really Matter?, 67 TENN. L. REV. 743, 748 (2000) ("State
courts frequently employ small juries for the trial of less serious offenses." (footnote
omitted)). While a single judge is permitted to adjudicate more serious criminal cases
in federal criminal trials, this requires the consent of the parties and the approval of
the court. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(a), (c).
77.
Ballew v. Georgia, 432 U.S. 223, 232 (1978).
78.
For example, the Swiss Code of Criminal Procedure prohibits a single judge
from adjudicating a case in which a penalty in excess of two years is sought. See CODE
DE PROCtDURE P9NALE SUISSE [CPP] [SwIss CRnMINAL PROCEDURE CODE] Oct. 5, 2007,

SR 312.0, RS 312.0, art. 19(2)(b) (Switz.) [hereinafter SwIss CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CODE]; see also KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, 1 AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE

LAW: THE FRAMEWORK 128-29 (2d ed. 1987) (translated by Tony Weir) (noting that in
France, single judges may preside only over minor cases). In the Swedish system,
which also uses mixed panels comprised of professional and lay judges, "[t]hree justices
sit as a panel on all matters that are considered of a minor nature whereas five justices
are necessary to decide more serious issues." Bernard Michael Ortwein II, The Swedish
Legal System: An Introduction, 13 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 405, 422 (2003).
Similarly, in the former Yugoslavia, "serious criminal cases" merited panels of five
rather than three judges. Ruggero J. Aldisert, Rambling Through Continental Legal
Systems, 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 935, 976 (1982).
79.
"Continental law does not permit major criminal trials to be conducted by a
single judge, who might be swayed by some bias against the defendant." James Q.
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Consequently, both the continental and common law judges who
penned the ICTY's initial RPE were likely familiar with domestic
safeguards designed to ensure the collaborative ability of their
respective fact-finding panels, such as requiring the uninterrupted
presence of those called upon for judgment. 80 Further to the same
end, the prospect of having alternate fact-finders present throughout
the proceedings exists in both systems.81 What is more, in the
absence of such alternates, numerous continental systems employ
protections quite similar to the remedy initially adopted by the ICTY.
Indeed, Rule 15(E) rather closely followed the Swiss approach,
present in varying forms elsewhere,8 2 which provides that when a
member of the judicial panel "becomes unable to attend during the
main hearing, the entire main hearing shall be held again unless the
parties waive this requirement."8 3
That Rule 15(E), as initially adopted, required consent from the
accused to continue hearings with a replacement judge was not the
product of the judges' unreflective acceptance of one of the many

Whitman, Equality in Criminal Law: Two Divergent Western Roads, 1 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 119, 140 (2009). "The telling French expression is: 'Juge unique, juge inique.'
('A single judge is an inequitable judge')." Mitchel De S.-.-l'E. Lasser, The European
Pasteurizationof French Law, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 995, 1012 n.91 (2005).
80.
A continental example can be found in Germany's criminal procedure code.
See STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [STPO] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE], Apr. 7, 1987,
BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL. I], 1074, 1319, as amended, § 226(1) (Ger.) ("The
main hearing shall be held during the uninterrupted presence of the persons called
upon to reach a judgment, as well as of the public prosecution office and a registry
clerk."). In the U.S. common law system, uninterrupted presence is likewise required.
See, e.g., Horne v. United States, 264 F.2d 40, 43 (5th Cir. 1959) ("The only time that
provision [can] be made for alternates [is] at the commencement of the trial."); see also
Diaz v. State, 740 A.2d 81, 86 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999) (upholding a decision that
deemed a juror "unable or disqualified" after the juror missed fewer than 10 minutes of
the trial due to inclement weather).
81.
For a common law rule, see FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(c) ("The court may impanel
up to 6 alternate jurors to replace any jurors who are unable to perform or who are
disqualified from performing their duties."). For a continental counterpart, see
Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz [GVG] [Courts Constitution Act], May 9, 1975, BGBL I,
§ 192(2) (Ger.), translatedby Kathleen Milller-Rostin ("At hearings of lengthy duration,
the presiding judge may order that additional judges be called in to attend the hearing
and take the place of a judge in the event that he is unable to be present."). Thanks to
Markus Wagner for helping to locate the relevant sections of German law.
82.
For example, the Russian Federation's Code of Criminal Procedure
provides that when a professional judge is replaced mid-trial, "the court proceedings
must restart from the beginning." RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 241,
translated in Moiseyev v. Russia, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 9, ¶ 110 (2011). Other continental
systems appear to permit mid-trial substitutions but actually forbid them in practice.
For example, the Egyptian Code of Criminal Procedure provides that if one judge
cannot attend in the high court, a substitution may be made by the President of the
Court of Appeal. Law No. 58 of 1937 (Criminal Code of 1937, reformed in 1952), AlJaridaAl-Rasmiyya, art. 367, T 2 (Egypt). Nevertheless, the commentary to the Code
provides that if a substitute judge has not heard all the oral proceedings, a re-hearing
is the only remedy. AHMED FATHI SOROOR, ALWASEETFEE KANOUN AL SGRAAT
ALGENAIA (THE INTERMEDIATE ON THE LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE) 829-30 (1996).
83.
SWISS CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, supra note 78, art. 335(2).
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proposals they received to assist them in drafting the rules,8 4 but
rather the result of the judiciary's "extensive debate and revision."85
In fact, of all the rulemaking suggestions the judges received, only
one addressed the issue of replacement judges.88 The proposed rule in
that submission allowed the new judge to seamlessly step into his
predecessor's role without any safeguards whatsoever. 8 7 In effect,
when the judges "turned their minds to the issue," they decided that
trial proceedings could continue with a replacement judge "only if the
accused agreed."88 If the defense did not agree, a rehearing would be
required.

Finally, as the ICTY's first President explained, the judges
aimed to improve upon the practice employed in the post-WWII
prosecutions.8 9 Presumably, this included an affirmative decision to
reject the IMTFE's "most objectionable" practice of introducing a

judicial substitute mid-trial. In fact, all other things being equal,90
introducing an unfamiliar judge into on-going proceedings would
have posed a much graver threat to the ICTY's ability to deliver a fair
trial than was the case at Tokyo. At the IMTFE, the new member's
vote could only have resulted in a conviction if five of the original
panelists were likewise convinced of the accused's guilt. By contrast,
at the ICTY, only two members of the judicial panel are required for a
determination of guilt. As a result, introducing an unfamiliar
adjudicator into ICTY proceedings could conceivably render an ICTY

84.
See, e.g., S.C. Res. 827, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) (seeking
judicial input on the rules by "request[ing] the Secretary-General to submit to the
judges .. . any suggestions received from States for the rules of procedure and
evidence"). The judges were "much assisted" by these submissions in the rulemaking
process. See Annual Report, supra note 55, ¶ 55.
85.
See Annual Report, supra note 55, ¶ 55.
86.
See Fairlie, Adding Fuel to Milosevic'sFire, supra note 68, at 119-20.
87.
"In the event of disqualification or recusal, another judge of the
International Tribunal may act in the matter in place of the disqualified or recused
judge." Suggestions Made by the Government of the United States of America, Rules of
Procedure and Evidence for the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in
the Former Yugoslavia, R.6.2(C), U.N. Doc. IT/14 (Nov. 17, 1993) [hereinafter U.S.
Suggestions], reprinted in 2 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 26, at 509, 520. The U.S.
proposal was "by far the most comprehensive" and "particularly influential." 1 MORRIS
& SCHARF, supra note 28, at 177. The submission of approximately seventy-five pages
included commentary for guidance. See id.
88.
Schabas, Influence of InternationalLaw, supra note 49, at 658-59.
89.
See Cassese, supra note 61, at 649-50 (pointing out the inadequacies of the
rules of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals and urging the ICTY "to adopt precise
and detailed rules . . . and to provide a solid basis for the rights of the defence").
90.
Admittedly, all other things were not equal. Among other issues, the
IMTFE suffered from "[a] unique problem of judicial absenteeism." Guido Acquaviva et
al.,

Trial Process, in

INTERNATIONAL

CRIMINAL

RULES 489, 775 (Gbran Sluiter et al. eds., 2013).
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Trial Chamber's verdict no more reliable than one delivered by a
single judge.9 1
A. More Comprehensive Look at Rule 15
The Rule that was first home to Rule 15(E), titled
"Disqualification of Judges," included a number of additional
provisions essential to the assurance of a fair proceeding before an
independent and impartial trial panel. In this vein, the rule
precluded a judge who had confirmed the indictment in a particular
case from later adjudicating the guilt or innocence of the accused. 92 It
also prohibited a member of the Trial Chamber on a case from
subsequently hearing its appeal. 93 In addition, the rule required
judges to withdraw in cases where their impartiality might be
affected, 94 and created the right for parties "to apply . . . for the

disqualification and withdrawal of [such] judge[s]."9 5
Reason suggests that the protections afforded by Rule 15(E) were
meant to apply every time a judge needed to be replaced during an
on-going trial, whether the departing judge was the subject of a self
or party-initiated disqualification or was rendered ineligible for some
other reason. Indeed, the fair trial concerns created by introducing a
new and unfamiliar judge into ongoing proceedings are matters
unrelated to the reasons why a departed judge may have departed.
Regardless of the circumstances of departure, concerns about the
replacement's ability to capably assess the evidence presented in his
absence, and unease regarding his independence and equality,
remain the same. This view is further supported by the text of Rule
15(E), which expressly dictated the practice to be followed when "a

91.
Indeed, an existing member could theoretically use his seniority to convince
the new judge to join in an aberrational result. See, e.g., Ten Cate, supra note 64,
at 1145 ("[T]he collegial nature of multi-member courts presents the risk that a
decision-maker who favors an aberrational result convinces at least one other member
of a panel to change his or her mind (perhaps because the first person is more
authoritative . .. )."). Notably, the prospect of holding ICTY trials before a single judge
had previously been raised and rejected. See, e.g., President of the International
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Rep. on the Operation of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 1178-81, U.N. Doc. A/55/382S/2000/865 (Sept. 14, 2000), available at http://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/
GEN/NOO/478/21/img/N0047821.pdf?OpenElement [http//perma.cc/SER9-ZJ6G] (archived
Oct. 23, 2014) (concluding that ICTY proceedings could not be expedited by holding
trials before a single judge "[gliven the complexity of the cases" and "because the
credibility of international justice would be too seriously affected").
92.
ICTY RPE, R.15(C), U.N. Doc. IT/32 (Mar. 14, 1994).
93.
Id. R.15(D). This provision became necessary because the judges decided to
provide for judicial rotation between Trial and Appeals Chambers. Id. R.27(A).
94.
See ICTY RPE, R.15(A), U.N. Doc. IT/32 (1994).
Id. R.15(B).
95.
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judge is, for any reason, unable to continue sitting in a part-heard
case." 96
Outside of Rule 15(E) in particular, all the provisions in the
original version of Rule 15 can rather effortlessly be read in a
harmonious fashion to arrive at this result. The sub-rules governing
self and party-initiated judicial disqualifications, for example,
dictated that the ICTY President appoint a replacement for a
disqualified judge.9 7 However, neither provision indicates how the
President is to be informed about the disqualification,9 8 nor addresses
the requisite procedure that is to follow the appointment of the new
judge. These issues, instead, were suitably addressed by Rule 15(E),
which required the Presiding Judge to report to the President about
the need for a replacement and dictated that a part-heard case could
continue with the new judge only with the consent of the accused.9 9
B. The Significance of a Rules-Based Analysis
One might be tempted to sideline the importance of this rulesbased assessment by noting that the overriding concern regarding the
use of replacement judges relates not to the ICTY's fidelity to its
rules, but instead to its ability to deliver on its statutory obligation to
ensure a fair trial. This view, however, overlooks the integral
relationship between the rules and the fairness of ICTY proceedings.

96.
Id. R.15(E) (emphasis added).
97.
See id. R.15(A), (B). In an effort to sever these two provisions from 15(E),
one might point out that the former require the President to appoint a replacement
judge while the latter appears to make the appointment optional, because the
President "may assign another judge to the case and order either a rehearing or, with
the consent of the accused, continuation of the proceedings from that point." Id.
R.15(E). Although perhaps inartfully placed, a more reasonable reading of this
permissive language in 15(E) is that it pertains to what happens after the replacement
has been appointed, as opposed to the appointment itself. On this reading, even with
the consent of the accused to continue proceedings, the President retains the right to
conclude that a rehearing would be the only suitable choice. On the other hand, if
appointing a replacement were optional under the sub-rule, so would continuing with
the prosecution. See ICTY Statute, supra note 2, art. 12(a) (requiring a three-judge
Trial Chamber). This seems an unlikely decision from a group of judges whose
affirmative aim it was to "minimise the possibility of a charge being dismissed on
technical grounds ..... Cassese, supra note 61, at 651 (explaining why the Rules were
designed to provide for a more active judiciary rather than rely on technical evidentiary
rules). Given this sentiment, based in no small part on the gravity of the crimes at
issue, the authority to terminate a prosecution ought only to be an exceptional measure
rather than a simple option under the sub-rule.
98.
The only potential exception to this observation is when a party-initiated
disqualification is decided by the Bureau. ICTY RPE, R.15(A), (B), U.N. Doc. IT/32
(Mar. 14, 1994). Because the President is part of that body, it could be argued that
notice in such cases is unnecessary. See id. R.23(A) ("The Bureau shall be composed of
the President, the Vice-President and the Presiding Judges of the Trial Chambers.").
See id. R.15(E).
99.
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As the ICTY recognized when it first undertook its work, in addition
to the fair trial guarantees contained in the ICTY Statute, "[o]ther
fair trial guarantees

appear in . . . the Rules

of Procedure

and

Evidence."1 00 This certainly is true of the rule provisions regarding
the mid-trial use of replacement judges. In effect, the relevant subrules both create a practice that raises potential fair trial concerns
and simultaneously provide remedies for these prospective
shortcomings.
In addition, as the shared Appeals Chamber has recognized, the
substantive rights of the accused include "a legitimate expectation to
be tried in a certain way in order to achieve the fundamental
objective of a fair trial."10 ' This is an integral part of nullum judicium
sine lege, the procedural principle of legality. In determining how to
proceed in the case against him, an accused ought to be able to rely
on a tribunal's compliance with its own rules. What is more, the
impact and importance of adhering to the designated rules extends
beyond simply ensuring justice in the case at hand. Of at least
comparable importance, faithfulness to the rules speaks to the
integrity of the institution. 102 Because the perceived legitimacy of the
ICTY derives, at least in part, from "the commitment to fundamental
fairness" evidenced in its RPE,' 0 the judges "must abide" by the
rules they create. 104 Lest the ICTY lose that credibility, it ought to
operate in a way that evidences a meaningful commitment to
accepting procedural constraints. As a result, the question of whether
the ICTY has acted in a manner consistent with its obligations under
the rules is intimately tied to both to its "fragile legitimacy" 0 5 and, as

100.
See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defence Motion
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 4 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia
Oct. 2, 1995), available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acdec/en/51002.htm [http://
perma.cc/7BEP-3K6V] (archived Sept. 28, 2014) [hereinafter Tadic Jurisdiction Appeal]
(providing, as an example, Article 13, which ensures the high moral character,
impartiality, competience, and integrity of the tribunal).
101.
Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko, Joint Case No. ICTR-98-42-Al5bis, Decision
in the Matter of Proceedings Under Rule 15 bis (D), ¶ 12 (Sept. 24, 2003) [hereinafter
Butare Appeals Chamber decision].
102.
"Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe
its own laws ..... Mapp, 367 U.S. at 659; see Stephen R. Munzer, A Theory of
Retroactive Legislation, 61 TEX. L. REV. 425, 434 (1982) ("Legitimacy demands
attention to the institutional justifications underlying particular laws and the legal
system as a whole.").
103.
See Diane Marie Amann, Harmonic Convergence? Constitutional Criminal
Procedurein an InternationalContext, 75 IND. L.J. 809, 843 (2000) (suggesting that the
"commitment to fundamental fairness" unifies "the tribunal's statutes and rules,"
which are composed from "dissimilar systems").
104.
See id.
105.
See Mirjan Damaska, Assignment of Counsel and Perceptions of Fairness,
3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 3, 4 (2005) (noting that it is important for "[an adolescent justice
system . . . with still fragile legitimacy" to be perceived as fair); see also Geert-Jan
Alexander Knoops, The Dichotomy Between Judicial Economy and Equality of Arms
Within International and Internationalized Criminal Trials: A Defense Perspective,
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the ICTY winds up its operations, 106 its institutional legacy. 107
Unfortunately, as the following section illustrates, "the Tribunal [has]
not [been] bound to its procedure in any meaningful sense."1 0 8
C. Subsequent Amendments
The ICTY's early commitment to ensuring an independent and
impartial trial panel appears to have been genuine. In fact, the first
time that the ICTY judges amended Rule 15 (E),1 0 9 the changes made
provided a very broad interpretation for what qualified as a "partheard" case and emphasized the accused's ability to demand a
rehearing in cases where a judge needed to be replaced mid-trial. The
28 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1566, 1566 (2005) (observing that "the legal-political
environment in which international and internationalized criminal courts function
brings greater attention to the credibility of these institutions" and that they must
work to maintain credibility and integrity).
106.
In December 2010, the UNSC created the MICT to "continue the
jurisdiction, rights and obligations and essential functions of the ICTY and the ICTR."
See MICT Statute, supra note 5, ¶ 4. The resolution allowed for a temporal overlap of
the work of the new institution and the ICTY, calling upon the latter to complete its
remaining work by the close of 2014. See id. ¶¶ 1, 3; see also The Mechanism for
InternationalCriminal Tribunals, ICTY, http://www.icty.org/sid/10874 [http://perma.cc/
N97W-H9PE] (archived Oct. 7, 2014) (explaining the role of the MICT).
107.
"This Tribunal will not be judged by the number of convictions which it
enters, or by the speed with which it concludes the Completion Strategy which the
Security Council has endorsed, but by the fairness of its trials." Prosecutor v. Milosevi6,
Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.4, Dissenting Opinion of Judge David Hunt on Admissibility of
Evidence in Chief in the Form of Written Statement, 1 22 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Oct. 21, 2003); see also Darryl A. Mundis, New Mechanisms for the
Enforcement of International HumanitarianLaw, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 934, 952 (2001)
("[From the long-term perspective, [international] institutions must render judicial
decisions of high quality and a relatively consistent jurisprudence that conforms with
emerging international norms . . . [because] the integrity of the nascent international
criminal justice system is at stake.").
108.
Cristian Defrancia, Due Process in International Criminal Courts: Why
ProcedureMatters, 87 VA. L. REV. 1381, 1430 (2001).
109.
In drafting its rules, the ICTY judiciary included a provision that enabled it
to continue with its "quasi-legislative" function in order to make ongoing changes to its
RPE. See ICTY RPE, R.6, U.N. Doc. IT/32 (Mar. 14, 1994) (governing the method by
which amendments to the rules are made). This power is shared by the judges at the
ICTR. The ICTR RPE has, over time, generally followed the changes employed by the
ICTY. "[I]t may be mentioned that similar Rules have been adopted by our sister
Tribunal, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia ('ICTY'). Our
Rules are, as it were, a replica of those Rules ..... Prosecutor v. Theoneste Bagosora,
Case No. ICTR-96-7-T, Decision on the Defence Motion for Pre-Determination of Rules
of Evidence (July 8, 1998); see also Prosecutor v. Laurent Semanza, Case No. ICTR-9720-I, Decision on Semanza's Motion for Subpoenas, Depositions, and Disclosure, 1 20
(Oct. 20, 2000) (noting that the ICTY has several rules that are identical to ICTR
rules). Nevertheless, the ICTR is not required to mimic the changes adopted at the
ICTY, so there are limited differences between the procedures employed at the two ad
hoc tribunals. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Casimir Bizimingu, Case No. ICTR-99-50-T,
Decision on Bizimingu's Motion for Provisional Release, ¶ 27 (Nov. 4, 2002) (noting
that the ICTR "has its own applicable Rules," which the ICTR is "bound to apply ... as
[they] stand").
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revised provision dictated that, after opening statements or the
beginning of the presentation of evidence, "the continuation of the
proceedings [could] only be ordered with the consent of the
accused."11 0
Over time, however, and as the ICTY began to confront serious
pressure to expedite its proceedings, other protections afforded by
Rule 15 began to give way to changes designed to accelerate trials,
beginning with a 1996 amendment to Rule 15(E) that permitted trial
chambers to hear routine matters in the absence of one of the three
judges.1 11 By 1998, the ICTY had begun to engage in a self-described
"overall effort . . . to expedite its proceedings," 112 an undertaking that
drew praise-and encouragement to continue-from the UN Security
Council." 3
In late 1999, the ICTY's dedication to this commanded efficiency
enterprise became incontestable, as the ICTY adopted a host of
amendments aimed "to speed up trials and .

.

. to minimize delays."

114 The casualties created by this quest for efficiency included the
protection in Rule 15 that barred the judge who confirmed an
indictment from later hearing that case at trial." 5 In effect, freeing
up confirming judges to try the consequent cases trumped "[t]he
importance of impartiality [that was] illustrated by" the initial
prohibition.1 16
Ironically, with the removal of this "procedural safeguard for the
accused" which aimed "to ensure that the three Judges hearing the
have [not] seen, reviewed, or in any way .. . appear to be
case ...

ICTY RPE, R.15(E), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.5 (June 15, 1995) (emphasis
110.
added).
See ICTYRPE, R.15(E), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.9 (July 5, 1996).
111.
Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Fifth Annual Rep. of the
112.
International Tribunalfor the Prosecutionof Persons Responsible for Serious Violations
of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia Since 1991, 1 86, U.N. Doc. A/53/219-S/1998/737 (Aug. 10, 1998)
[hereinafter 5th Annual Report].
See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1166, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1166 (May 13, 1998)
113.
(praising the Tribunal's efforts by "[n]oting the significant progress being made in
improving the procedures of the International Tribunal, and convinced of the need for
its organs to continue their efforts to further such progress").
See Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Seventh Annual Rep. of the
114.
International Tribunalfor the Prosecutionof Persons Responsible for Serious Violations
of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia Since 1991, ¶ 288, U.N. Doc. A/55/273-S/2000/777 (Aug. 7, 2000)
[hereinafter 7th Annual Report].
115.
See ICTY RPE, R.15(C), U.N. Doc. IT/32 (Mar. 14, 1994). Similarly, Rule 15
also provides: "No member of the Appeals Chamber shall sit on any appeal in a case in
which he sat as a member of the Trial Chamber." Id. R. 15(D).
M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & PETER MIANIKAS, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL
116.
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 805 (1996) (emphasis added)
(concluding that the prohibition "impl[ied] that Judges should interpret their
obligations under the Rule broadly to avoid even the appearance of impropriety").
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biased by the [pretrial] material,"11 7 came a new provision that
enabled members of the trial panel to adjudicate guilt despite not
having seen or reviewed material introduced at trial, and without the
consent of the accused. The possibility appeared as part of a new rule,
Rule 15 bis, titled "Absence of a Judge," in a provision that permitted
trials to continue for a period of up to three days before an incomplete
judicial panel.1 18 Significantly, this provision-Rule 15bis(A)-which
was later extended to a period of five days,"1 9 was adopted with the
expectation (but not the requirement) that the absent judge would
read the transcript of the missed proceedings and have the
opportunity to view the video-recordings of them, "in order to judge
for himself or herself with the demeanour of the witnesses."1 2 0
Rule 15 bis, later adopted by the ICTR as well, 12 1 also included a
verbatim transfer-and consequently an affirmative endorsement for

117.
Prosecutor v. Kabiligi & Ntabakuze, Case Nos. ICTR-97-34-I, ICTR-97-30-I,
Separate and Concurring Opinion of Judge Dolenc, Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion
to Amend the Indictment, j 25 (Oct. 8, 1999). The importance of the protection against
this is well-illustrated by the description of the confirmation process as shared by
former Chief Prosecutor Richard Goldstone. According to Goldstone, the indictment
process usually involves requests for further information on the part of the judge; "not
infrequently the merits of the indictments or aspects of it are debated [by the judge and
chief prosecutor]. Th[is] review process might take days or even weeks." RICHARD J.
GOLDSTONE, FOR HUMANITY: REFLECTIONS OF A WAR CRIMES INVESTIGATOR 108 (2000).

For more on how this process might undermine the fairness of later proceedings, see,
for example, 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 28, at 155 (observing also that, as a result
of having confirmed the indictment, the judge "may have already formed an opinion
[about] the charges" or may seem to have a vested interest in conviction). For a
contrary view, espoused by a former member of the ICTYs Office of the Prosecutor, see
Whiting, supra note 29, at 90 (maintaining that the prima facie standard for obtaining
an indictment "has not been difficult to satisfy, and has generally been applied by the
judges deferentially").
118.
ICTY RPE, R.15 bis (A), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.17 (Nov. 17, 1999). As
explained in its next annual report, the provision was designed to enable for continued
proceedings upon "the unavoidable and legitimate absence of a judge owing to illness or
for urgent personal reasons." See 7th Annual Report, supra note 114, 1 295; see also
ICTY RPE, R.15 bis (A), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.17 (Nov. 17, 1999).
119.
ICTY RPE, R.15 bis (A), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.26 (Dec. 12, 2002).
120.
See Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko, Joint Case No. ICTR-98-42-Al5bis,
Dissenting Opinion of Judge David Hunt, 1 26 (Sept. 24, 2003) [hereinafter Dissenting
Opinion of Judge David Hunt]. The importance that a fact-finder be able to make an
independent assessment regarding the demeanor and, therefore, the reliability of
witnesses is one that has been recognized by, among other entities, the European Court
of Human Rights. See, e.g., Kostovski v. Netherlands, 166 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 43
(1989) (noting that "caution in evaluating the statements" of absent, anonymous
witnesses "can scarcely be regarded as a proper substitute for direct observation").
121.
The provision was adopted in Arusha nearly a year and a half later. See
Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, R.15 bis,
U.N. Doc. ITR/3 (May 31, 2001) [hereinafter ICTR RPE]. The subsequent Annual
Report of the ICTR limits its comment on the new rule to noting that it enables
proceedings to continue before two judges for an abbreviated period. See Int'l Crim.
Trib. for Rwanda, Sixth Annual Rep. of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of
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the continued vitality-of the provision in Rule 15 that conditioned
continuing part-heard proceedings before a substitute judge upon the
accused's consent. 12 2 Given the addition of the new rule, this revised
location made sense. The sub-rule set out the appropriate procedure
to be followed upon a judge's long-term absence from a case, a
condition that could of course stem from the "disqualification of
judges" (the title of Rule 15), but also from a host of other causes.
Moreover, that the ICTY decided to retain the protective language of
the original Rule 15(E) in its entirety-despite, by then, significant
pressure to expedite ICTY proceedings-suggests that the ICTY
judges recognized the important role Rule 15(E) played in ensuring a
fair process. 123
Notably, the ICTY would continue to impose the consent
requirement for an additional three years. Indeed, the provision
survived even the "wide-scale reforms" undertaken in 2000124 to

enhance its efficiency. 125 Ultimately, however, as the UN's focus on
the exit strategies of the ICTY and ICTR remained intense, 12 6 the
InternationalHumanitarianLaw Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan
Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the
Territory of Neighbouring States Between 1 Januaryand 31 December 1994, T 74, U.N.
Doc. A/56/351-S/2001/863 (Sept. 14, 2001) (indicating that the amended rule permits a
case to be heard by two judges "for a period not exceeding five days, if the third judge is
unable to sit at this hearing due to certain reasons").
122.
See ICTY RPE, R.15 bis (C), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.17 (Nov. 17, 1999).
123.
Admittedly, there is always an element of speculation in ascertaining the
legislative intent behind rule amendments. See Darryl A. Mundis, The Legal Character
and Status of the Rules of Procedureand Evidence of the ad hoc InternationalCriminal
Tribunals, 1 INT'L CRIM. L. REV. 191, 207 (2001) (explaining that the intent behind rule
amendments is often unclear because "[tihe records of the ICTY and ICTR Plenaries
are not publicly available"). This stems from the fact that the plenary sessions at which
amendments are made and the records of these meetings are private. See Mia Swart,
Ad Hoc Rules for Ad Hoc Tribunals? The Rule-Making Powers of the Judges of the
ICTY and ICTR, 18 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 570, 573 (2002).
124.
Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Rep. on the Judicial Status of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the Prospects for
Referring Certain Cases to National Courts, ¶ 5 n.1, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/2002/678,
(June 19, 2002).
125.
See Chairman of the Expert Group, Rep. of the Expert Group to Conduct a
Review of the Effective Operation and Functioningof the InternationalTribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 22, U.N.
GAOR, 54th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/54/634 (Nov. 22, 1999) (reporting that the changes were
made in response to an externally created expert report that evaluated the efficiency of
the ICTY and ICTR); see also 7th Annual Report, supra note 114, 1 320 (explaining
that the expert group was tasked to report on the functioning of the ICTY and ICTR
pursuant to the General Assembly's request that the Secretary-General evaluate the
efficiency of the operation and function of the Tribunals).
126.
See Press Briefing, ICTR, Press Briefing by the ICTR Spokesman,
ICTR/INFO-9-13-020.EN (Nov. 15, 2001) (noting that the issue of completion was the
"clear undercurrent" of meetings held in New York that year and projecting that the
ICTR, with the assistance of additional ad litem judges, could complete trials in the
first instance in 2008 or 2009). At the same time, proposals regarding completion
strategies were made by the President and Prosecutor of the ICTY. See Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia, Ninth Annual Rep. of the International Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International
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ICTY judges responded in late 2002 by essentially eviscerating the
accused's veto power. While an accused could continue to object to
continuing an ongoing trial with a new judge, new Rule 15bis(D)
authorized the remaining two trial judges to override the accused's
wishes whenever they unanimously agreed that "doing so would serve
12 7
the interests of justice."
As the ICTY President acknowledged, the amendment was
meant to be an important tool in the ICTY's quest to comply with its
completion strategy. By "reducing the chances of mistrials
necessitating time-consuming re-trials," the change was intended to
enhance the speed with which the ICTY fulfilled its mission.1 28 A
similar story emerged from the ICTR, which adopted the amended
version of Rule 15 bis shortly thereafter. 129 Like his ICTY
counterpart, the ICTR President identified the amended rule as a
1 30
reform "implemented with a view to accelerat[e] the proceedings."
More than a decade later, however, it's unclear to what extent the
amendment has fulfilled this goal. What is apparent, though, is that
the revision has come at no small cost to either the ICTY or ICTR in
terms of its reputation for providing just proceedings.

HumanitarianLaw Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991,
Summary, U.N. Doc. A/57/379-S/2002/985 (Sept. 4, 2002).
127.
The amended rule also specifies that the decision to so proceed is subject to
interlocutory appeal, the new judge may only sit after certifying familiarity with the
record of the proceedings, and a substitution that is contrary to the wishes of the
accused may only be made once. ICTY RPE, R.15 bis (D), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.26
(2002).
128.
Press Release, Statement of Judge Theodor Meron, President of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Before the Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe, U.N. Doc. JL/P.I.S./786-e (Oct. 14, 2003),
available at http://www.icty.org/sid/8186 [http://perma.cc/TJ4-AEQT] (archived Sept.
24, 2014).
129.
See ICTR RPE, R.15 bis (D), U.N. Doc. ITR/3/Rev.11 (May 27, 2003)
(amending the ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence to permit "the remaining judges
[to] decide to continue the proceedings before a Trial Chamber with a substitute Judge"
even if "the accused withholds his consent"). Although this amendment may appear to
have been inspired by a then-existing case in which it was immediately used, Judge
Hunt maintains that "[t]he judges of the Rwanda Tribunal were merely following their
usual practice of adopting relevant amendments which had previously been made by
the judges of the Yugoslav Tribunal to the Tribunal's Rules." Dissenting Opinion of
Judge Hunt, supra note 120, 1 9.
130.
U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4838th mtg., at 9, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4838 (Oct. 9,
2003); see Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda, Completion Strategy for the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, ¶ 42, U.N. Doc. S/2004/341 (May 3, 2004) (indicating
that the amended version of Rule 15 bis allows cases to continue in certain
circumstances).
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V. THE APPLICATION OF NEW RULE 15BIS(D)
The earliest applications of the amended rule proved problematic
from a fairness perspective for reasons beyond its permitting trial
proceedings to continue with a new judge over the accused's objection.
At both the ICTY and ICTR, the amended rule was first applied in
cases that commenced prior to the respective rule amendments. As a
result, the use of new Rule 15bis(D) appeared an affront to the RPE
requirement that rule amendments "shall not operate to prejudice the
rights of the accused .

.

. in any pending case."1 31

Remarkably, however, the ICTR Appeals Chamber concluded in
the Butare case that the amended rule did not operate to prejudice
the rights of the accused, as the consent requirement was not in fact a
substantive right. 132 Conspicuously at odds with then-recent
jurisprudence noting "the great weight attached to consent as a
means of determining and safeguarding the rights of the accused to a
fair hearing," 133 the Appeals Chamber instead maintained that
consent "was only a safeguard" that "gave protection against possible
arbitrariness in the exercise of the power of the Tribunal to continue
the hearing with a substitute judge." 1 34 Puzzlingly, the Appeals
Chamber then decided that empowering the two remaining judges to
continue the proceedings somehow amounted to "a safeguard of
equivalent value." 35
Of course, if the accused was originally given a veto power in
order to prevent judges from acting arbitrarily, it seems illogical-if
not disingenuous-to suggest that subsequently enabling the judges
to override that power might amount to a comparable protection.1 36
Moreover, the assertion is particularly dubious when one considers
that the two deciding judges will not only have been part of the trial
from the start, but also part of a system now operating under
significant pressure to expedite its proceedings. Indeed, the decision

131.
ICTR RPE, R.6 (C), U.N. Doc. ITR/3/Rev.11 (May 27, 2003); ICTY RPE, R.6
(D), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.28 (July 28, 2003).
132.
See Butare Appeals Chamber decision, supra note 101, 1 13 ("The Appeals
Chamber will . .. proceed on the footing that the amendment concerns a substantive
right, in the sense of there being a legitimate expectation to be tried in a certain way in
order to achieve the fundamental objective of a fair trial, and that retrospectivity is
consequently involved in applying the amendment to a pending trial.").
133.
Prosecutor v. Thdoneste Bagosora, Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Decision on
Continuation or Commencement De Novo of Trial (June 11, 2003) [hereinafter
Bagosora, Continuation Decision].
134.
See Butare Appeals Chamber Decision, supra note 101, 1 17 (emphasis
added).
135.
See id. ¶¶ 18-19.
136.
See, e.g., Fairlie, Adding Fuel to Milosevic's Fire, supra note 68, at 138-39
(arguing that the consent of the accused, originally created because "the judiciary
determined that its own activity needed to be subject to the veto power of an outside
entity," becomes meaningless when "a determination made by two of [the judiciary's]
own members [can] override such a safeguard").
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to continue proceedings before a substitute judge in Butare-which,
in the matter, overrode the objections of five out of six jointly-tried
defendants-provides ample evidence of this latter concern.1 37
Not long after, the ICTY used Rule 15 bis in a manner that
similarly demonstrated a preference for avoiding costly and timeconsuming retrials over assuring the fairness of its proceedings. After
the loss of the Presiding Judge in the Milosevic case, the two
remaining judges opted to continue the then-lengthy proceedings,13 8
just three months after the ICTY President informed the UN Security
Council "Rule 15 bis cannot be used in cases in which a lengthy trial
is significantly under way." 1 3 9 At the time, the Prosecution had
presented evidence for over two years, and was in the final stages of
its case-in-chief. 140 With trial transcripts then exceeding 32,000 pages
and more than 300 witnesses called, it is little wonder that what
seemed a pre-ordained decision to proceed with a replacement
judge1 4 1 prompted observers to question the fairness of the process

137.
The two remaining judges in the Butare case considered such extraneous
factors as the right to a speedy trial for those still in custody and the financial costs to
the public in making its "interests of justice" determination. The two judges also
expressed concern about the ramifications of finding in favor of those accused.
According to the pair, "while consideration of the need for every judge to assess
demeanour is certainly a very important one, we note that it must be considered with
care, for any precedent that sets it up as the overriding consideration of what it means
to have a fair trial will make it extremely difficult - if not impossible - ever to order
continuation of a trial pursuant to Rule 15bis(D)." Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko, Joint
Case No. ICTR-98-42-T, Decision in the Matter of Proceedings Under Rule 15bis(D),
¶ 33(e) (July 15, 2003).
138.
See Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic, Case No. IT- 02-54-T, Order
Pursuant to Rule 15 bis (D) (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 29, 2004)
(determining that, in the interest of justice, the proceedings should continue with a
substitute judge).
139.
See President of the International Criminal Tribunal of the Former
Yugoslavia, Letter dated Jan. 13, 2004 from the President of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia
since 1991 addressed to the President of the Security Council, annexed to U.N.
Secretary-General, Letter dated Jan. 20, 2004 from the Security-General addressed to
the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2004/53 (Jan. 21, 2004) (emphasis
added). The relevant portion of the letter stresses that the Rule's requirement that a
judge certify familiarity with the proceedings is "not a mere formality but a
requirement of fairness." Id.
140.
See Former Yugoslavia: Justice on THial, ECONOMIST (Feb. 26, 2004),
available at http://www.economist.com/printededition/printerfriendly.cfm?StoryM=2460574
[http://perma.ec/Q2RG-KULA] (archived Sept. 28, 2014) (predicting that the two
remaining judges would opt to continue the trial).
141.
Before the remaining judges considered whether it would be in the
interests of justice to continue the proceedings, a Tribunal spokesperson asserted that
"the court was nevertheless planning to continue with Milosevic trial 'as planned."' Ana
Uzelac, Milosevic Back to Old Self, INST. FOR WAR & PEACE REP. (Nov. 9, 2005),
http://iwpr.net/report-news/milosevic-back-old-self [http://perma.cc/4T6W-3VJM] (archived
Oct. 30, 2014) (quoting Jim Landale). In fact, even before Milosevic's position was
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and the ICTY's integrity. 14 2 Commentators were likewise quick to
criticize the ICTY for what it had failed to do, describing the lack of
an alternate judge as "inexcusable."1 43
Later cases similarly buttress the notion that concerns about
expediency militated in favor of continuing trial proceedings despite
potential fairness concerns. In fact, every single interests of justice
determination made in the wake of an accused's objection resulted in
44
a decision by the two remaining judges to continue the proceedings,1
including one decision in which the parties were not even initially
consulted on the matter. 145 What is more, ICTR jurisprudence
sought on the matter, the Tribunal's President announced that "Judge May's
resignation will not have an unduly disruptive effect on any proceedings before the
Tribunal." Press Release, ICTY, Statement of Judge Theodor Meron, President of the
ICTY, upon the Resignation of Judge Richard George May, MF/P.I.S./824e (Feb. 22,
2004).
142.
See, e.g., Scharf, supra note 49, at 39 (noting that the Tribunal's handling of
the loss of the Presiding Judge in the Milosevic matter "does not receive high marks for
fairness" and that "[i]n a domestic case, this would have been grounds for a retrial or
dismissal"); Elizabeth Sullivan, Putting a Twist on Justice, Tribunal's Tactics in
Milosevic Case are a Cause for Concern, PLAIN DEALER, Aug. 1, 2004 (describing the
decision as "cause for concern") (on file with author). Among the fairness concerns
raised were doubts that the new judge could actually familiarize himself with the
record of the proceedings within the Tribunal's preferred timeframe. "Had a
replacement figure been waiting in the wings on [the day that the two remaining
judges opted to continue the case], with [the proposed] start date of 1 June, he would
have needed to read in excess of 500 pages of transcript per day in order to catch up on
the written record of the proceedings." Fairlie, Adding Fuel to Milosevic's Fire, supra
note 68, at 143 (emphasis omitted) (footnotes omitted) (noting that in the same space of
time the judge would also have to review the nearly 200 decisions that had already
been rendered and more than 300 exhibits then entered into evidence).
143.
See Geoffrey Robertson, Fair Trials for Terrorists?, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THE "WAR ON TERROR" 169, 179 (Richard Ashby Wilson ed., 2005) ("Certainly it was a
mistake, for a trial of even half [its] length, not to make provision for an alternate
judge. . . ."); Scharf, supra note 49, at 39 (concluding that an alternate judge ought to
have been appointed "given the expected length of the trial, the importance of the
defendant, and the age of the judges").
144.
See Karemera v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-98-44-AR15bis.2, For Decision
on Interlocutory Appeals Regarding the Continuation of Proceedings with a Substitute
Judge and on Nzirorera's Motion for Leave to Consider New Material, ¶¶ 3-4 (Oct. 22,
2004) [hereinafter Karemera, Reasons for Decision on Interlocutory Appeals] (noting
two separate decisions by the remaining judges to continue proceedings). Other sets of
remaining judges similarly found it in the interests of justice to continue proceedings at
both the ICTY and ICTR. See Krajisnik, Decision Pursuant to Rule 15 bis (D), supra
note 69, TT 10, 14; Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, Decision on the
Continuation of the Proceedings, Rule 15 bis of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence
(Mar. 6, 2007) (noting at ¶ 71, that only 13 of more than 100 intended prosecution
witnesses had by then testified); see also Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR-9844-T-AR15bis.3, Decision on Appeals Pursuant to Rule 15bis (D), TT 18-24, 40-46 (Apr.
20, 2007) [hereinafter Karemera, Decision on Appeals Pursuant to Rule 15bis (D)]
(upholding the judges' decision to continue the trial despite the fact that the defendants
withheld consent and "find[ing] that the continuation ... would not result in a failure
to uphold their fair trial rights").
145.
In 2004, the two remaining judges in the Karemera case first decided to
continue on-going proceedings with a replacement judge without hearing from the
parties. After being directed by the Appeals Chamber to give the parties the
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expressly rejected the time-consuming suggestion that the substitute

judge be required to view the entirety of the available videorecordings of witness testimony. 14 6
At the same time, the developing jurisprudence was not entirely
hostile to the defense. In at least one matter, for example, the

Appeals Chamber found that the remaining judges had abused their
discretion in deciding to continue a case.1 47 Of broader significance,
some of the decisions applying revised Rule 15 bis included an
apparent recognition that, at some stage in the proceedings, a
decision to continue with the trial would constitute an abuse of
discretion.
An early articulation of this view can be found in the Butare
case, in which the Appeals Chamber recognized that it would not
always be in the interests of justice to proceed with a replacement
judge in every part-heard case. In Butare, the Appeals Chamber
rejected the notion that there could be a pre-determined, "hard and
fast relationship between the proportion of witnesses who have
already testified and the exercise of the [discretionary] power to order
a continuation . . . with a substitute judge,"' 4 8 concluding instead that
it is up to the two remaining judges "to establish the precise point
within a margin of appreciation at which a continuation should be
ordered."1 49 Implicit in these observations is the notion that in every
case there will be a juncture at which continuation would not serve
the interests of justice, although "[t]he stage reached in each case
50
need not always be the same."'
In harmony with this interpretation, and citing to Butare, the
remaining judges in the Krajisnik case endorsed the view that there
is such a thing as a "cut-off line," at which the interests of justice will
require a rehearing, although where that line lies "is not clear in the
abstract."1 5 Accordingly, the judges focused on whether the new
judge would be able to "master[] the case within a reasonable amount
of time," considering such factors as the amount of witnesses already

opportunity to be heard, the judges again decided to continue the proceedings. See
Karemera, Reasons for Decision on Interlocutory Appeals, supra note 144, ¶¶ 3-4.
146.
Prosecutor v. Karemera, ICTR-98-44-T, Decision on Joseph Nzirorera's
Submission to Substitute Judge, 1 11 (June 8, 2007) (affording great deference
regarding the methods employed by the substitute judge to familiarize himself with the
proceedings conducted in his absence and maintaining that it would be "offensive" to
require the judge to detail his familiarization process).
147.
See Karemera, Reasons for Decision on Interlocutory Appeals, supra note
144, ¶ 72.
148.
Butare Appeals Chamber decision, supra note 101, ¶ 27.
149.
Id. T 23 (emphasis added).
150.
Id. ¶ 27.
151.
Krajisnik, Decision Pursuant to Rule 15 bis (D), supranote 69, ¶ 13 ("Since
a given case is likely to differ significantly from another in its nature and history, it is
preferable that a court limits itself to an assessment of its own particular
circumstances in the light of applicable principle.").
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heard and "the fidelity and accessibility of the trial record." 152
Critically, the decision also highlighted the importance of the "gap
between the level of familiarity of the continuing judges and the
substitute judge."15 3 In ultimately deciding to continue with the partheard case, and in accord with the collegiality concerns noted above,
the judges concluded that "[m]ost importantly, the gap in mastery of
the case between the substitute judge and the sitting judges is likely
to be of little practical significance." 154

VI. THE

INTRODUCTION OF ALTERNATE JUDGES

The notion that mid-trial judicial substitutions will at some
stage offend the interests of justice is likewise consistent with
subsequent amendments made to the ICTY's Statute and Rules,
which provided at least a partial answer to critics of the Milosevic
case. In December 2005, the ICTY judiciary authorized its newly
elected President, Fausto Pocar, to propose that the UN Security
Council appoint ad litem judges who could serve as judicial
alternates, or "reserve judges," for Trial Chamber panels in multiaccused trials. 155 By that time, joint trials had become a key part of
the ICTY's efforts to comply with its completion strategy, 156 with
some cases bulging to encompass as many as nine accused15 7 and
prompting the reconstruction of ICTY courtrooms to accommodate the
increased number of co-accused. 5 8
The move to incorporate reserve judges-"the most visible sign of
unhappiness" with the practice of replacing judges in pending
trials' 5 9 -was ultimately successful. New Rule 15 ter was adopted

Id. ¶ 14.
152.
153.
Id. 1¶ 14-15 (acknowledging that a gap remained in the case "at least in
theory" despite its conclusion, at T 14, that "the difference between a first-hand
experience of the case [under consideration in which just over one-third of the
Prosecution's witnesses had been heard], and a second-hand review of it, is very
limited").
154.
Id. ¶ 18 (emphasis added).
155.
See Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Thirteenth Annual Rep. of
the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the
Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, 1 26, U.N. Doc. A/61/271-S/2006/666 (Aug. 21, 2006)
[hereinafter 13th Annual Report].
156.
See Mariam Ahmedani et al., Updates from the International Criminal
Courts, 13 HUM. RTS. BRIEF, no. 2, 2006, at 41 (describing the detailed measures that
the ICTY had taken, including joint trials, to comply with the "completion strategy").
157.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Popovic, Case No. IT-02-57-PT, Decision on Motion
for Joinder, ¶ 36(c) (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 21, 2005)
(approving the joinder of six cases, over the objection of the relevant accused).
158.
See 13th Annual Report, supra note 155, ¶ 112.
159.
See William A. Schabas, Independence and Impartialityof the International
Criminal Judiciary, in FROM HUMAN RIGHTS TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW:
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once the UN Security Council approved the necessary additional
judges.s0 Rule 15 ter introduced the possibility of assigning a reserve
judge to sit with the three judges assigned to a case, with the crucial
requirement that the "reserve Judge .

.

. be present at each stage of a

trial to which that Judge has been assigned." 1 6 Rule 15 ter also
protected against the possibility of losing a judge in the midst of
deliberations by requiring that reserve judges "shall be present, but
shall not vote, during any deliberations in a trial."1 62 Although rightly
heralded as "a long-awaited reform" and a move that perhaps
"reflect[ed] dissention and unhappiness among the judges themselves
about the previous practice,"' 6 3 the new rule nevertheless failed to
cure all the Tribunal's ills.
Rather than provide for a reserve judge in every case, whether
an alternate is to be assigned at all is a matter of Presidential
discretion.1 64 As a result, the possibility of employing a substitute
judge in the midst of trial and over the objections of the accused
endured.1 65 In fact, the revised rules peculiarly appear to permit an
unfamiliar judge to join the bench-mid-trial and over the objection of
the accused-even when a reserve judge has been assigned. 166
Moreover, gearing the new rule's protections solely to the trials of
multi-accused 167 further narrowed the promise reserve judges
STUDIES IN HONOUR OF AN AFRICAN JURIST, THE LATE JUDGE LAITY KAMA 571, 589-90

(Emmanuel Decaux, Adama Dieng & Malick Sow eds., 2007).
160.
See S.C. Res. 1660, art. 12, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1660 (Feb. 28, 2006)
(providing for the appointment of ad litem judges who could serve as reserve judges).
161.
ICTY RPE, R.15 ter (B), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.37 (Apr. 6, 2006).
162.
Id. R.15 ter (D).
163.
Schabas, supra note 159, at 590.
164.
See ICTY RPE, R.15 ter (A), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.37 (Apr. 6, 2006).
165.
See id. R. 15 bis (D). "The perceived harm to the accused in being tried by a
substitute judge that has not been present during all parts of the trial may be
minimised by ... the allocation of reserve judges .....
Sarah Williams, The
Completion Strategy of the ICTY and the ICTR, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDURES 153, 179 (Michael Bohlander

ed., 2007).
166.
"If, in a trial where a reserve Judge has been assigned in accordance with
Rule 15 ter, a Judge is unable to continue sitting and a substitute Judge is not assigned
pursuant to paragraphs (C) or (D), the trial shall continue with the reserve Judge
replacing the Judge who is unable to continue sitting." R.15 bis (G), U.N. Doc.
IT/32/Rev.37 (Apr. 6, 2006). This anomalous provision was corrected in the rules
created for the MICT, which provide that, "If, in a trial where a reserve Judge has been
assigned in accordance with Rule 20, a Judge is unable to continue sitting, the trial
shall continue with the reserve Judge replacing the Judge who is unable to continue
sitting." Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, R.19(E), U.N. Doc. MICT/1 (2012) [hereinafter MICT RPE].
167.
See 13th Annual Report, supra note 155, Summary & ¶1 20, 26, 115
(reporting changes to the Tribunal to accommodate multiple defendants including the
appointment of additional reserve judges and changes to the courtrooms). Consistent
with this plan, as of July 2009, reserve judges had been assigned only in multi-accused
cases, specifically, Popovic et al. (5 co-accused), Milutinovic et al. (6 co-accused), and
Prlic et al. (6 co-accused). See Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Sixteenth
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afforded.1 68 The ICTY later deviated from this narrow policy in the
high profile Karadzic case in late 2009,169 but the decision to expand
the use of reserve judges beyond cases involving multiple accused was
not followed in the edelj prosecution.

VII. THE SE ELJ MATTER
The failure to provide for a reserve judge in the §egelj case, then,
resulted in an outcome that was not only unfortunate, but also
avoidable. If anything, Segelj's conduct prior to the start of his trial in
2007 ought to have provided sufficient notice that the length of his
prosecution might well rival that of any multi-accused case and was,
correspondingly, likely to benefit from the insurance provided by a
reserve judge. Indeed, Segelj had all but single-handedly engineered
the more than four year gap between his first (and decidedly
70
vexatious) courtroom appearanceo
and when his "trial started anew
on 7 November 2007."171 By that stage, Segelj's penchant for using his
pro se status to obstruct tribunal proceedings had been amply
demonstrated 72 and, having just regained the right to self-represent
by orchestrating a hunger strike, 7 3 could only have been expected to
continue.174

Annual Rep. of the InternationalTribunalfor the Prosecutionof Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International HumanitarianLaw Committed in the Territory of
the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, 1 38, 45, 46, U.N. Doc. A/64/205-S/2009/394 (July
31, 2009) [hereinafter 16th Annual Report].
168.
Despite these limitations, the new Rule gave the ICTY an advantage over
its companion tribunal. Remarkably, the ICTR neither adopted Rule 15 ter nor in any
other fashion adopted a provision regarding reserve judges. See ICTR RPE, U.N. Doc.
ITR/3/Rev.22 (Apr. 10, 2013).
169.
See Prosecutor v. Karadzic, Case No. IT-95-5/18-PT, Order Assigning ad
litem Judges to a Case Before a Trial Chamber (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Sept. 4, 2009).
170.
See Transcript of Hearing at 54, Prosecutor v. Segelj, Case No. IT-03-67-I
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 26, 2003) (demanding to be heard
regarding the judiciary's "strange clothing," allegedly reminiscent of "the inquisition of
the Roman Catholic Church," and contending "psychologically I find this unacceptable,
and I insist that everyone should wear normal civilian clothing").
171.
Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Seventeenth Annual Rep. of the
International Tribunal for the Prosecutionof Persons Responsible for Serious Violations
of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia Since 1991, ¶ 44, U.N. Doc. A/65/205-S/2010/413 (July 30, 2010).
172.
See generally Prosecutor v. Segelj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on
Assignment of Counsel, ¶¶ 32-66 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 21,
2006) (providing examples of Segelj's inappropriate and disruptive behavior).
173.
See, e.g., David Scheffer, Atrocity Crimes Litigation: Year-in-Review (2011)
Conference Abridged Transcript, 11 Nw. U. J. INT'L HuM. RTS. 146, 159, $$ 110-11
(2013) (providing Mark Harmon's suggestion that egelj's success was tied to the
contemporaneous death of Slobodan Milosevic). "No doubt concerned about eielj's
grave condition and the negative publicity his death would have generated, the
Appeals Chamber essentially capitulated to 8eielj's demands." Nancy Amoury Combs,
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Predictably, Seielj's conduct contributed markedly to the length

of his 2007 trial,'1 5 although his three-judge panel remained intact
until well after closing arguments were heard in March 2012. Upon
Judge Harhoff's disqualification after more than a year of the panel's
deliberations,1 76 however, there was no reserve judge waiting to take
his place.' 77 As a result, the e§elj case presented the ICTY with an
unprecedented set of facts. It furthermore presented the novel
question of how to proceed once a trial panel is rendered incomplete

in the midst of deliberations.
A. The September 2013 Order
Less than a week after Judge Harhoff's disqualification, Acting
President Agius issued a follow-up order that began by noting that
when a new judge replaces a disqualified one pursuant to Rule 15, the
rule "does not set out any procedures to be followed in the event of
such a replacement."1 78 Rather, the Acting President noted, it is

Rules

"15bis(C) and 15bis(D)

of the Rules [that]

set out the

procedures to be followed in the event that a Judge is, for any reason,
unable to continue sitting in a part-heard case for a period which is
likely to be longer than of a short duration.""'
1.

Accuracy

As noted above, this view that the relevant provisions in Rules
15 andl5 bis are interrelated is consistent with the text of 15bis(C),
which sets out the procedure to be followed whenever "a Judge is, for
Legitimizing International Criminal Justice: The Importance of Process Control,
33 MICH. J. INT'L L. 321, 352 (2012).
174.
Indeed, the one year lag between the reinstatement of Segelj's right to selfrepresent and the commencement of the 2007 case was "largely ... a consequence of
Seielj's pretrial demands." Combs, supra note 173, at 352-53.
175.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Sebelj, Case No. IT-03-67-T, Decision on Oral
Request of the Accused for Abuse of Process, ¶ 29 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Feb. 10, 2010) (noting that the proceedings against gegelj had to be
suspended in order for him to answer the charge of contempt of the Tribunal).
176.
See Harhoff Disqualification Decision, supra note 14, 1 13 (finding that, in
light of Judge Harhoffs letter, "an unacceptable appearance of bias exists").
177.
"Undoubtedly, had there been a reserve Judge in the Chamber, the
replacement of the disqualified Judge would not have created any problems and the
reserve Judge would have sat as a regular Judge. Consequently, the judgement would
have been delivered at 0900 hours on 30 October 2013." Prosecutor v. Segelj, Case No.
IT-03-67-T, Judge Antonetti's Concurring Opinion on Decision Inviting the Parties to
Make Submissions on Continuation of Proceedings, at 6 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Nov. 13, 2013) [hereinafter Judge Antonetti's Concurring Opinion].
178.
Prosecutor v. Segelj, Case No. IT-03-67-T, Order Following Decision of the
Panel to Disqualify Judge Harhoff, at 1 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Sept. 3, 2013) [hereinafter September 2013 Order], available at http://www.icty.org/
x/cases/seselj/tord/en/130903.pdf [http://perma.cc/H6EK-JBLC] (archived Oct. 6, 2014).
179.
Id.
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any reason, unable to continue sitting in a part-heard case." 180 What
is more, the broad language in the sub-rule is fundamentally sound.
Logic suggests that the decision to provide procedural safeguards in
the event that a new judge joins a case mid-trial reflects the
judiciary's view that the practice raises fair trial concerns. Indeed,
case law expressly acknowledges this by describing "consent as a
means of determining and safeguarding the rights of the accused to a
fair hearing" 181 and maintaining that the procedures required when
proceedings are continued in the absence of consent include
"safeguards [that] ensure that fair trials rights are not
compromised." 182 That these safeguards are sweepingly applicable
reflects the fact that the fair trial concerns they are designed to
address exist irrespective of the reasons why a Chamber has been
rendered incomplete. Accordingly, failing to apply them in the wake
of a mid-trial judicial disqualification would render the trial process
at best arbitrary and at worst unfair. Critically, however, Rules 15
and 15 bis could not be applied in tandem to the Segelj matter, as the
procedure set out in the latter applies only to part-heard cases, a
prerequisite that the Acting President acknowledged did not align
with the "more advanced stage" of the Segelj proceedings.1 8 3
2.

The Procedural Misstep

Assuming, as this work does, that the above interpretation is
correct, 184 it would have been proper for the Acting President to then
conclude that the RPE prohibited the use of a replacement judge in
Segelj's case. Because the Rules permit the use of replacement judges
only in part-heard cases, and only then upon compliance with
designated procedural safeguards, it is reasonable to conclude that
the prospect of introducing new judges to completely heard cases is
simply not permitted. In this regard, Judge Robinson's comments in
the Aleksovski trial are instructive: "Where, as in the instant case,
the particular subject . . . is dealt with, but a potential aspect or

modality of it has been omitted, the proper construction is that that
aspect or modality is prohibited." 1 85 Remarkably, however, rather
than conclude that the specificity of the existing rules curtailed the

180.
ICTY RPE, R.15 bis (C), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.49 (May 22, 2013) (emphasis
added).
181.
Bagosora, Continuation Decision, supra note 133.
182.
Karemera, Decision on Appeals Pursuant to Rule 15 bis (D), supra note
144, $ 43 (noting that the replacement must certify familiarity with the record of the
proceedings before assuming the bench).
183.
September 2013 Order, supra note 178.
184.
See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
185.
Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-AR73, Dissenting Opinion of
Judge Patrick Robinson, 1 22 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 16,
1999).
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ICTY's ability to proceed with a replacement judge, the Acting
President opted instead to disregard the specificity of the Sub-rule
entirely. Jettisoning the "part-heard case" requirement, the
September Order concluded that Rules 15bis(C) and 15bis(D) "ought
to be applied mutatis mutandis" (with the necessary changes).18 6
a.

Fairness and Credibility Considerations

Contrary to the Acting President's assertion that this
modification would advance the aims of "fairness and transparency,"
the suggested scheme could only have had the opposite effect. As to
the former concern, jettisoning the "part-heard case" requirement
could scarcely be deemed to enhance the fairness of the proceedings,
particularly in light of the collegiality considerations noted above.
Rather, reason-and germane case law 1 87-suggests that the greater
the gap in familiarity between the new and existing judges, the
greater the negative effect on the fairness of the proceedings.
Moreover, the blitheness of the proposal to eliminate the express
requirement hardly contributes to any transparency aim. To the
contrary, it suggests a disconcerting willingness to ignore the rule
constraint simply because it proves inconvenient to continuing the
proceedings.' 8 8 In effect, by ordering that the ICTY ought not to be
bound by its rules as written, this aspect of the September order
creates the impression that the ICTY is not even "somewhat just," 8 9
a perception hardly remedied by the events that followed.
b.

The Rejection of the Order

Immediately following the September Order, the Presiding Judge
rejected the Acting President's plan, maintaining that applying Rules
15 and 15 bis, in tandem, amounted to "play[ing] around" with the
Rules, as 15 bis ("Absence of a Judge") "concerns an entirely different
situation" than Rule 15 ("Disqualification of Judges")."1 90 In other

186.
September 2013 Order, supra note 178.
187.
See supra notes 146-52 and accompanying text (providing examples of
Tribunal rulings that address the use of substitute judges).
188.
"The Acting President claims (without explanation) that [Rule 15 bis]
applies 'mutatis mutandis.' Apparently, that's Latin for 'because we want it to."' Kevin
Jon Heller, What Part of "Part"Does the ICTY Not Understand?,OPINIO JURIs (Oct. 31,
2013, 10:47 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/10/31/part-part-icty-understand thttp://
perma.cclWY2K-WZJE] (archived Oct. 6, 2014).
189.
"[1]f a legal system is at least somewhat just, the rational and legitimate
expectations it induces may have some prima facie moral claim to be honored."
Munzer, supra note 102.
190.
Prosecutor v. Segelj, Case No. IT-03-67-T, Decision to Unseal the Report of
the Presiding Judge to the President of the Tribunal or Alternatively to the Judge
Designated by Him Regarding the Motion for Disqualification of Judge Harhoff, at 3
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words, the Presiding Judge somehow decided that substitutions made
in the wake of judicial disqualification do not benefit from the
protections that are otherwise available whenever a judge is replaced
mid-trial.
This conclusion, however, overlooks the text of Rule 15bis(C),191
its initial placement as Rule 15(E) under the title "Disqualification of
Judges", 192 and its later word-for-word transfer to a new rule
governing absent judges (which, indeed, disqualified judges are).' 9 3
What is more, it renders the trial process arbitrary; although fairness
concerns are created whenever a mid-trial substitution is made,
under the Presiding Judge's interpretation, a select class of cases
(substitutions made pursuant to judicial disqualification) are
exempted from the protections afforded in all other cases. In
response, the Acting President rejected this questionable
interpretation, yet also implicitly authorized its application, leaving it
to the newly constituted Segelj Trial Chamber to decide upon the
procedure to be followed in determining whether the trial should
proceed.1 94
B. The December 2013 Decision
Free to interpret the rules as they saw fit, the newly constituted
Selelj Chamber operated from the assumption that the alleged
disconnect between Rule 15 and Rule 15 bis created a lacuna in the
rules, permitting the Chamber to consider the question of
continuation pursuant to Rule 54.*195 Dubbed the "General Rule," Rule
54 enables a Judge or Trial Chamber to issue orders "as may be
necessary .

.

. for the conduct of trial" 9 6 and applies in the absence of

(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 4, 2013) [hereinafter Decision to
Unseal], available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/seselj/tdec/en/130910.pdf [http://perma.cc/
F34J-SDW5] (archived Oct. 6, 2014).
191.
ICTY RPE, R.15 bis (C), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.49 (2013) (setting out the
procedure to be followed whenever "a Judge is, for any reason, unable to continue
sitting in a part-heard case" (emphasis added)).
192.
See supra note 60 and accompanying text (providing the original text of
Rule 15(E), which addressed judicial substitutions).
193.
See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text (discussing the adoption of
New Rule 15 bis, which addresses substitute judges).
194.
Prosecutor v. Segelj, Case No. IT-03-67-T, Order Assigning a Judge
Pursuant to Rule 15 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 31, 2013)
(continuing to maintain that "the interests of fairness and transparency are indeed
better protected by the application of the regime envisaged in Rule 15bis of the Rules,
and that this Rule may correctly be applied mutatis mutandis").
195.
See Segelj, Continuation Decision, supra note 3, ¶ 2 (indicating that the
Tribunal would make its decision "[p]ursuant to Rule 54 of the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence" and failing to mention Articles 15 or 15 bis).
196.
Rule 54 ("The General Rule") provides: "At the request of either party or
proprio motu, a Judge or a Trial Chamber may issue such orders, summonses,
subpoenas, warrants and transfer orders as may be necessary for the purposes of an
investigation or for the preparation or conduct of the trial." ICTY RPE, R.54, U.N. Doc.
IT/32/Rev.49 (May 22, 2013). The Rule is based upon Article 19(2) of the ICTY Statute.
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more specific rules of procedure.1 97 Not surprisingly, the broadness of

Rule 54 has been criticized both for being "a bold act of judicial selfaggrandizement" and for the amorphous powers it appears to bestow:
"one must already know what the limits of the judicial power at the
international tribunal are in theory or in practice to know when one
is entitled to rely upon the rule." 9 8
Arguably, however, there are cases when deciding upon the
legitimate use of Rule 54 does not involve a Herculean undertaking.
Indeed, at least some limits on judicial power ought to be
immediately apparent and others ascertainable upon thoughtful
consideration of the Statute and Rules. In these latter cases, however,
and as the December decision demonstrates, the use of the General
Rule may present a different problem: judicial unwillingness to
engage in the analysis required to divine the appropriate limits of a
egelj panel
Trial Chamber's authority. 199 Indeed, had the
on
its
ability
to
act,
it would
to
ascertain
the
constraints
endeavored
unfairness
to
the
accused
and
a
decision
that
results
in
have avoided
brings the ICTY into serious disrepute.
1.

The Procedural Misstep

In anticipation of the December decision, the Presiding Judge
promised to proceed in a way that "w[ould] best favour a fair
determination of the matter," 200 language drawn directly from Rule
89, the rule that addresses evidentiary lacunae. 201 In fact, the
202
Presiding Judge's avowed intention to use Rule 89 as a template
appeared rather well aligned with Trial Chamber's obligation to
See BASsIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 116, at 908. Article 19(2) provides that a "judge
may .. . issue such orders and warrants for the arrest, detention, surrender or transfer
of any persons, and any other orders as may be required for the conduct of the trial."
ICTY Statute, supra note 2, art. 19(2).
197.
"Rule 54 contains a general power vested in the Trial Chamber to fill up
lacuna." Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalid, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Decision on the Prosecutor's
Motion for an Order requiring Advance Disclosure of Witnesses by the Defence, ¶ 41
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 4, 1998).
198.
Alexander Zahar, InternationalCourt and Private Citizen, 12 NEW CRIM. L.
REV. 569, 576 (2009) (criticizing the judiciary's decision to bestow such broad authority
upon itself).
199.
This will certainly be the case when the rule is being used to provide
"plausible cover." Id. at 577 (citing this as the reason for using the rule to authorize a
raid in Kosovo).
200.
Judge Antonetti's Concurring Opinion, supra note 177, at 4-5.
201.
"In cases not otherwise provided for in this Section, a Chamber shall apply
rules of evidence which will best favour a fair determination of the matter before it and
are consonant with the spirit of the Statute and the general principles of law." ICTY
RPE, R.89(B), U.N. Doc. IT/32/rev.49 (May 22, 2013).
202.
"By taking as an example the circumstances described in respect of
evidence, I believe that I can then apply certain rules in keeping with the Statute and
the general principles of law to deliver a judgement expeditiously." Judge Antonetti's
Concurring Opinion, supranote 177, at 5 (emphasis removed).
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ascertain the limits of its powers under the General Rule, as Rule 89
requires the judges to use their discretion "in harmony with the
Statute and other rules to the greatest extent possible."2 03
All told, however, the December decision in Segelj provides no
evidence of compliance with this plan. Although much could certainly
have been learned from reviewing the Tribunal's significant history in
crafting and interpreting its rules on replacement judges and in
considering their impact on the accused's right to a fair trial, none of
this is addressed in the decision. Instead, after four brief paragraphs
in which no reference is made to either the ICTY's Statute or its
Rules, the Trial Chamber concludes that assigning a new judge at the
deliberations stage "does not represent an obstacle to the
continuation of proceedings." 204 In other words, the newly constituted
Trial Chamber made no effort to determine the limits of its
discretionary power.
Had it done so, it would have had to contend with Rule 15 bis,
even assuming the provision is not directly applicable to the situation
in Segelj. In effect, the fact that the rules expressly limit the use of
replacement judges to part-heard cases suggests that, absent a
compelling reason to the contrary, a comparable limit governs the
Chamber's Rule 54 powers. More definitively still, the appellate case
law interpreting Rule 15 bis not only acknowledges the link between
Rule 15 bis safeguards and fair trial rights,2 05 but also indicates that,
even in cases that are only partly heard, there will be a stage at
which continuation with a replacement judge would not serve the
interests of justice. 206 Reaching beyond a mere interpretation of 15
bis, this jurisprudence speaks more broadly to the relationship
between the use of replacement judges and the ICTY's statutory
obligation to provide a fair trial and, accordingly, establishes that the
decision to continue the Segelj case exceeded the limits of the power
bestowed by Rule 54.
a.

Fairness and Credibility Considerations

Existing jurisprudence not only establishes that the Selelj panel
was out of bounds in its use of Rule 54, but that its end result-

203.
"A Trial Chamber's exercise of discretion under Rule 89(C) ought, pursuant
to Rule 89(B), to be in harmony with the Statute and the other Rules to the greatest
extent possible." Prosecutor v. Kordic & Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-AR73.5, Decision
on Appeal Regarding Statement of a Deceased Witness, 1 20 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia July 21, 2000).
204.
Segelj Continuation Decision, supra note 3, 1 55.
205.
See Karemera Decision on Appeals Pursuant to Rule 15 bis (D), supra note
144, ¶ 43.
206.
See supra notes 146-52 and accompanying text (providing examples of
Tribunal rulings that concluded substitute judges would not serve the interests of legal
writing).
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introducing a new judge during the deliberations phase-is unfair.
Considering the observations made in the Krajsnik case, 20 7 under any
legitimate analysis, "the gap in mastery of the case" between Judge
Niang, upon familiarizing himself with the record of a multi-year trial
conducted in his absence, and that of the sitting judges would be one
of striking significance. Similarly, it could hardly be said that the
difference between the first-hand experience of the remaining judges
and that of Judge Niang would be in any way limited. Rather, the gap
between the level of familiarity of the continuing judges and Judge
Niang would not exist simply in theory but in fact.
What is more, this disparity is not something that can be cured
upon viewing even the entirety of video recordings available for Judge
Niang "to study the conduct of witnesses in court and to evaluate
their credibility." 208 With the remaining judges having observed all
the evidence first-hand over a course of years, it runs counter to
reason to suggest that Niang's condensed research will result in
vigorous deliberations in which he can meaningfully advance his
views and effectively test those of the original panel members. 209
Under the circumstances, both social science research as well as logic
indicate that there will be a patent hierarchy within what is meant to
be a panel of equals and, consequently, irreparable damage to the
deliberative process. 210 As French jurist and former ICTY Prosecutor
Frank Terrier explains, "[t]he collegial nature of the decision is
effective only if all the judges making up the Chamber are fully
informed, in the same way, of all elements of the trial."2 11
While this disparate access to evidence alone arguably denies
Segelj a judicial panel poised to engage in the collaborative enterprise
essential for a verdict of enhanced accuracy, the most profound threat
to the revised Chamber's collegiality stems from another source: the
eighteen months of prior deliberations engaged in by the two
remaining judges. Indeed, even if all members of the modified panel
genuinely embrace the plan to resume the proceedings from the close
of hearings, it strains the limits of imagination to suggest that the
remaining judges will be able to do so unaffected by their prior

207.
See supra notes 151-54 and accompanying text (discussing the Krajsnik
determination that, at a certain point, a rehearing will be necessary in order for the
substitution judge to fairly consider the case).
208.
Segelj Continuation Decision, supra note 3, ¶ 53.
209.
Moreover, viewing the entirety of the available footage of witness testimony
is not even required. Rather, "each Judge, as a professional Judge, has his own method
when seeking to familiarise himself with the proceedings." Nzirorera's Submission to
Substitute Judge, supranote 144, ¶ 11.
210.
"[F]amiliar group members are likely to trust one another more than
unfamiliar group members." Gruenfeld et al., supra note 72, at 11. By contrast, when
the new judge-as stranger-introduces a perspective that differs from those held by
the remaining judges, his assessment is likely to be dismissed. See id.
211.
Terrier, supra note 63, at 1313.
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deliberations. As a an initial matter, this time spent pondering "the
amount of evidence and the complexity of events and applicable
law" 212 can have no effect other than to cement the inferior status of
the new judge and evoke a natural tendency to teach him all that was
learned in his absence.
Notably, domestic practice provides important evidence of the
lingering effect of prior deliberations by including measures that
prohibit or limit the prospect of substituting alternate jurors, postsubmission, owing to the likelihood that "'the continuing jurors would
be influenced by the earlier deliberations."' 213 Despite likely
assertions to the contrary, this analogy cannot properly be dismissed
on the basis that the relevant players in the Seielj case are
"professional judges, who by virtue of their training and experience"
are not susceptible to the same influences on their decision-making as
their lay counterparts.2 1 4 In fact, the details of the egelj matter
suggest far greater impediments to the ability of the remaining
judges to "erase from their minds their past deliberations and start
anew" 2 15 than any that might encumber their lay counterparts.
As a starting point, it is inconceivable that a lay jury's initial
deliberations would rival even a fraction of the eighteen months
expended in the Selelj matter, or that its original jurors would be
significantly beholden to ensuring that this was time well spent. By
contrast, the revised Selelj panel has expressly defended the duration
of the prior considerations by directly tying the length to "the
complexity of the proceedings, especially the number of counts, the
amount of evidence and the complexity of events and applicable
law." 216 Assuming this is accurate, as the matter approaches eight
years in duration, three years post-trial, and as UN Security Council

212.
Seelj Continuation Decision, supra note 3, ¶ 23.
213.
See, e.g., United States v. Cencer, 90 F.3d 1103, 1107 (6th Cir. 1996)
(quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 23 advisory committee's note (1983)). Until 1999, the U.S.
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure prohibited the post-submission substitution of
alternate jurors, a practice now permitted as a matter of judicial discretion. See FED. R.
CRIM. P. 24(c)(3) committee notes (1999); see, e.g., Alison Markovitz, Note, Jury Secrecy
During Deliberations, 110 YALE L.J. 1493, 1517 (2001) (concluding that the
amendment "demonstrate[s] the significance of efficient trial management and the
desire to avoid costly mistrials"). Similarly, Illinois permits the practice on a
discretionary basis, although it acknowledges that "substitution of an alternate juror
during deliberations involves substantial potential for prejudice." People v. Roberts,
824 N.E.2d 250, 260 (Ill. 2005). Other states continue to prohibit the practice. See, e.g.,
Hayes v. State, 735 A.2d 1109, 1120 (Md. 1999).
214.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Oric, Case No. IT-03-68-T, Order Concerning
Guidelines on Evidence and the Conduct of Parties During Trial Proceedings, ¶ 11
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 21, 2004) (quoting Prosecutor v.
Delalii, Case No. IT-96-21, Decision on the Motion of the Prosecution for the
Admissibility of Evidence, ¶ 20 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 19,
1998)).
215.
United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 985 (5th Cir. Unit B Dec. 1981).
216.
egelj Continuation Decision, supra note 3, ¶ 23.
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members "closely follow and study the course of [the] protracted
case[]," 217 there could scarcely be a greater impetus to relyconsciously or unconsciously-upon the work already done. Finally,
the prospect that the two remaining judges may be infected by their
prior considerations is unlike the abstract contamination concerns
that motivate domestic practice in this area. The extensive
deliberations in the Segelj case involved a judge later disqualified by
the ICTY for having "demonstrated a bias in favour of conviction,"2 18
a fact that, standing alone, raises questions about the fairness of all
the prior proceedings in which Judge Harhoff participated.2 1 9
This observation leads to a final and significant collegiality
concern: the disconcerting possibility that the two remaining judges
already believe in Segelj's guilt. Indeed, at least one commentator has
posited that this conclusion is implied by the decision to continue the
proceedings, a move "that will delay the verdict by perhaps another
two years." 220 Considering this postponement in light of the Presiding
Judge's contention that Seielj's then-long-term stint in provisional
detention "should be given absolute priority over any other
considerations," 221 the belief that it is "unthinkable that the two
remaining judges might have been inclined to acquit"2 2 2 is certainly
understandable. 223 If true, this would, in turn, render the collegial

217.
Comments of Evgeny Zagaynov (Russian Federation), U.N. SCOR, 68th
Sess., 7073d mtg., at 25-26, UN Doc. S/PV.7073 (Dec. 5, 2013). When the respective
tribunal presidents and prosecutors addressed the UNSC in December 2013, and
members of the Council responded, numerous additional speakers directly referred to
the Segelj matter against a backdrop that emphasized the need for expediency in the
Tribunals' completion strategies more than fifteen times.
218.
Harhoff Disqualification Decision, supranote 14, T 14.
219.
"In my view, since a Bench of the Tribunal found an apprehension of bias
against Judge Harhoff and he is disqualified in the e§e1j case on that basis, it is
already implied that all the proceedings in which Judge Harhoff participated could
have been unsafe." Prosecutor v. Segelj, Case No. IT-03-67-AR15bis, Decision on
Appeal against Decision on Continuation of Proceedings, Dissenting Opinion of Judge
Koffi Kumelio A. Afande, ¶ 14 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 6,
2014).
220.
Schabas, 8edelj Gets a New Judge, supra note 19.
221.
Decision to Unseal, supra note 190, at 3.
222.
Schabas, e§elj Gets a New Judge, supra note 19.
223.
Segelj 's long-term detention had been a matter of consistent concern for the
Presiding Judge. See, e.g., Decision to Unseal, supra note 190, at 3; Judge Antonetti's
Concurring Opinion, supra note 177, at 2. As a result, the revised Trial Chamber
attempted proprio motu to explore the possibility of Segelj's release during Niang's
familiarization period, but Se~elj refused to cooperate. See Prosecutor v. Segelj, Case
No. IT-03-67-T, Order Terminating the Process for Provisional Release of the Accused
Proprio Motu (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 10, 2014).
Controversially, and likely motivated by the concern that Segelj would die incarcerated
in advance of a verdict, the two remaining judges recently opted to grant him
provisional release. Prosecutor v. Segelj, Case No. IT-03-67-T, Order on the Provisional
Release of the Accused ProprioMotu (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov.
6, 2014). Judge Niang, still in the process of familiarization, dissented "with regret" in
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ability of the revised Chamber even less tenable. As domestic law
instructs, when prior deliberations lead to a conclusion of guilt, the
subsequent coercive effect upon the new fact finder is bound to be
substantial and, if a judgment of guilt is rendered rapidly,
"manifestly inherent." 224
On this latter point it bears mentioning that, if a judgment
appears quickly after Niang certifies his familiarity with Seielj's
case, 22 5 the speedy delivery might have an alternate explanation,
although one that does not constitute an improvement from a fairness
perspective. Instead, it involves the troubling possibility that the
newly constituted Trial Chamber's avowed intention to resume its
proceedings from the close of hearings is nothing more than
"fiction." 226 Under this theory, Judge Niang might simply "add his
name to the final decision that must already have been in a definitive
draft form when Judge Harhoff departed," 227 a seemingly tempting
option when ICTY judgments require extensive time to draft and
routinely run "several-hundred-pages-long." 228 That this possibility
has even been raised bespeaks the damage the Segelj matter has
wrought upon the ICTY's reputation.
C. The Recent Appeal
Regrettably, the problems particular to the September order and
the December decision have been reinforced, rather than mitigated,
on appeal. Not only does the June 2014 Appeals Chamber decision
fail to meaningfully address the Trial Chamber's use of Rule 54,229 it
simultaneously endorses the President's September order, concluding
that Rule 15 bis ought to govern the Segelj matter mutatis
mutandis.230 In other words, the Appeals Chamber decided that
light of egelj's prior-and never disavowed-unwillingness to abide by conditions of
release. Prosecutor v. egelj, Case No. IT-03-67-T, Dissenting Opinion of Judge
Mandiaye Niang to the Order on the Provisional Release of the Accused ProprioMotu
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 11, 2014).
See United States v. Lamb, 529 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1975) (finding
224.
that a reconstituted jury failed to conscientiously and carefully reconsider a case upon
finding guilt after just 29 minutes of deliberations).
In June 2014, Judge Niang indicated that he would need more time to
225.
adequately familiarize himself with the case. Prosecutor v. Segelj, Case No. IT-03-67-T,
Order Inviting the Parties to Make Submissions on Possible Provisional Release of the
Accued Proprio Motu, at 2 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 13, 2014).
This remains unchanged as this article goes to press.
226.
See Schabas, e§elj Gets a New Judge, supra note 19 (describing the notion
that deliberations will begin anew as an "implausible claim").
227.
Id.
228.
See Patricia M. Wald, The InternationalCriminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia Comes of Age: Some Observations on Day-To-Day Dilemmas of an
InternationalCourt, 5 WASH. U. J.L. & POLY 87, 93 (2001).
229.
See Segelj Appeal, supra note 23, ¶ 16 (recognizing simply "that the Trial
Chamber acted pursuant to Rule 54 . . . instead of pursuant to Rule 15bis").
230.
See id. $ 20.
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Segelj was due all the fair trial safeguards provided by the Rule other
than its part-heard case limitation. The decision then acknowledges,
yet essentially leaves unexamined, the statutory right to a fair trial.
Disregarding the collegiality concerns noted above, and neglecting to
engage with the dissent's contention that "it cannot be in the
interests of justice to continue with proceedings which have been
23
contaminated by the apprehension of bias,"a
the Appeals Chamber

instead concluded that the Trial Chamber's decision to continue the
proceedings with a new judge was an act of discretion performed with
no discernible error.2 32
D. Summary
Driven by an apparent desire to see the Segelj proceedings come
to an end as quickly as possible, the Tribunal's decision-making in the
wake of Judge Harhoffs disqualification has consistently fallen short
of the mark. By ordering the remaining judges to disregard an
express limitation on the use of replacement judges, rather than
recognize it as a barrier to continuation, the Acting President made
credible the view that the ICTY is "a rogue court with rigged
rules."23 3 Followed by the decision of the newly constituted Trial
Chamber that turned a blind eye to the rules, the constraints existing
jurisprudence placed upon its authority to act, and the impact its
ruling had upon the statutory obligation to ensure a fair trial, this
negative perception of the ICTY only intensified.
With these procedural missteps now reinforced on appeal, the
ICTY has missed out on an important opportunity to repair both the
Seielj prosecution and its own reputation. In years to come, Segelj's
case may well be remembered for his vexatious, disrespectful and
contemptuous conduct,234 but this view is likely to be overshadowed
by the long reach of the ICTY's ultimate faithlessness to its rules and
complete failure to genuinely consider the fairness implications of
inserting a new judge into a completely heard case. In the moment,
these failings have already empowered the ICTY's critics, who
legitimately question the feasibility of the familiarization process

231.
Prosecutor v. Segelj, Case No. IT-03-67-AR15bis, Decision on Appeal
against Decision on Continuation of Proceedings, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Koffi
Kumelio A. Afande, ¶ 18 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 6, 2014).
232.
See Begelj Appeal, supra note 23, ¶¶ 40-45.
233.
See John Laughland, The Anomalies of the InternationalCriminal Tribunal
are Legion, TIMES (London) (June 18, 1999), http://www.oldsite.transnational.org/
SAJT/features/haaganomaly.html [http://perma.cclDDB2-8B4G] (archived Sept. 23,
2014).
234.
See Scheffer, supra note 173, at 159, 1 112 (using all three adjectives to
describe the accused).
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required of the new judge, 235 and compellingly contend that the
ICTY's completion strategy has preempted a conversation about "the
criteria for justice in The Hague." 236 Worse still, the Segelj ignominy
23 7
has distanced equally vocal, long-standing supporters of the ICTY,
2 38
who have lamented its fall.

VIII. LESSONS LEARNED

Perhaps the most evident lesson to be learned from the problems
associated with the use of replacement judges at both the ICTY and
ICTR, and the egelj matter in particular, is that alternate judges in
international criminal proceedings-despite their price tag-are
worth their weight in gold. While it of course costs money to
designate alternates, there are huge expenses associated with the
events liable to occur in their absence. Most apparently, retrying a
case from the start is a costly undertaking. Perhaps less obviously,
continuing with a replacement judge likewise has its costs, including
the time afforded for replacements to familiarize themselves with the
proceedings, the recalling of necessary witnesses, and related
appeals. Regardless of whether a case is retried or continued, the
resultant proceedings will be more protracted than the seamless
continuation made possible by having an alternate, rendering the
relevant court less efficient overall.
What is more, and as the gegelj case amply demonstrates, there
are numerous non-monetary costs involved whenever a judicial panel
is rendered incomplete. Trials meant to foster post-conflict
reconciliation seem rather more likely to alienate that portion of the
domestic population that might identify with the accused, with
members in this group almost certain to view continuing the

235.
See, e.g., ICTY Decides to Continue Trial to Vojislav Seseli, INNEWs (Serb.)
(Dec. 16, 2013, 9:16 PM), http://inserbia.info/news/2013/12/icty-decides-to-continuetrial-to-vojislav-seselj/ [http://perma.cc/5R4Q-TBPG] (archived Sept. 30, 2014) (quoting
a Serbian Radical Party Official's assertion that it will take the new judge two years to
get up to speed on the trial "if he reads at the speed of light"); see also Suvakovic, supra
note 18.
236.
See Suvakovic, supra note 18 ("[I]t seems that the international community
and those who initiated the formation of the ICTY no longer have the time or the
patience to discuss the criteria for justice in the Hague, but wish that the Tribunal
ceases its operations according to the Completion Strategy without further
discussion.").
237.
See, e.g., Heller, The Final Nail in the ICTY's Coffin, supra note 22 ("I've
always defended the legitimacy of the ICTY . . .. But no longer.").
238.
See William A. Schabas, ProsecutorApplies to Reverse Final Acquittal of
Perigid, PHD STUDIES IN HUMAN RIGHTS (Feb. 7, 2014, 7:33 AM), http://humanrights
doctorate.blogspot.com/2014/02/prosecutor-applies-to-reverse-final.html [http//perma.cc/
SHR8-3DZU] (archived Sept. 30, 2014) (denouncing the mid-deliberations judicial
replacement as one in a series of recent decisions causing "damage to the reputation of
this troubled institution").
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proceedings with a new judge as unfair and suspect. This perception
will undoubtedly be amplified-and rightly so-if replacements are
made in cases whose proceedings are significantly underway, as was
the case in Milosevic and, most egregiously, in Se&elj. While in such
cases a rehearing will undoubtedly seem more just, this option also
has non-monetary costs.
Non-expeditious proceedings not only have the potential to
undermine the rights of the accused, 2 39 but also to damage the
perception of the relevant institution, as delayed verdicts tend to
undermine public confidence in the relevant system of justice. 240 This
will especially be true when the accused is-as most international
criminal accused are-lingering in provisional detention. Indeed,
given the already marked disparity between international criminal
practice in this area and the dictates of international human rights
law, adding to the average amount of time a presumed-innocent
accused spends in detention is apt to undermine the relevant court's
reputation as a whole. 24
In as much as the eielj case is a cautionary tale about the
importance of appointing judicial alternates, it likewise signifies the
imperative that international criminal courts prioritize the fairness of
their proceedings by ensuring fidelity to the provisions that govern
them. While it is true that established justice systems will also suffer
from credibility problems when they disregard rule constraints, this
problem is far more pronounced for relatively nascent courts. As
international criminal courts endeavour to establish their legitimacy
both with local populations 242 and within the international

239.
The right to be tried without undue delay is recognized in all the major
international human rights law documents. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 66,
art. 14(3)(c); ACHR, supra note 66, art. 8(1) ("Every person has the right to a hearing,
with due guarantees and within a reasonable time."); European Convention, supra note
66, art. 6(1) ("[E]veryone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable
time.").
240.
See Hafida Lahiouel, The Right of the Accused to an Expeditious Trial, in
ESSAYS ON ICTY PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK
MCDONALD 197, 198 (Richard May et al. eds., 2001) (noting the importance of the
public's interest in expeditious proceedings in light of the fact that "[tihe Tribunal's
mandate includes bringing peace in the territory of the former Yugoslavia"). Justice
delayed also seems likely to cause the relevant institution to lose the support of
victims. See, e.g., Richard J. Goldstone, The Role of the United Nations in the
Prosecution of International War Criminals, 5 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 119, 123-24
(2001) (contending that a delay in justice "is grossly unfair to ... victims").
241.
See Megan A. Fairlie, The Precedent of PretrialRelease at the ICTY: A Road
Better Left Less Traveled, 33 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1101, 1174 (2010) (discussing how the
ICTY's approach to provisional release falls short of international human rights law
standards, undermining the value of its precedent).
242.
See, e.g., Jane E. Stromseth, The InternationalCriminal Court and Justice
on the Ground, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 427, 434-35 (2011) (arguing that international courts
must "address public concerns about their work and engage in meaningful outreach to
affected populations [in order to] build public trust in justice and the rule of law").
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community, it is incumbent upon them to demonstrate that their
authority is proper. 243
A. The Significance for the MICT
The institution perhaps best positioned to learn from the ICTY
and ICTR experience with replacement judges is the MICT. The
MICT was recently created to carry on and conclude the work of the
ICTY and ICTR, prosecuting the outstanding cases of both
Tribunals. 244 In almost all relevant respects, the provisions governing
the MICT mirror those in place at its predecessor institutions, 24 5
meaning that it is equally possible to introduce a new judge in the
midst of trial (or, in the wake of the now-settled Segelj precedent,
during deliberations) and over the objections of the accused. In other
words, it is within the realm of possibility for the MICT, geared to
prosecute only "the most senior leaders suspected of being most
responsible" for the atrocities committed in the former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda, 246 to encounter in these prosecutions a repeat of the
events in Milosevic or, worse still, those in Selelj, should the MICT
fail to appoint a reserve judge. 24 7
Accordingly, in order for the MICT to ensure that the legacy of
the ICTY is not further tarnished, it will be incumbent upon the
MICT to refrain from repeating the mistakes of its predecessor
courts. This means ensuring fidelity to the statutory obligation to
provide a fair trial 248 and scrupulously honoring the express terms of
the provisions that govern its operations. It also requires thoughtful
consideration of existing jurisprudence, including a good faith effort

243.
See David Luban, Fairness to Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality, and the
Legitimacy of International Criminal Law, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 569, 579 (Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas eds., 2010); see also Damaska,
supra note 105.
244.
See MICT Statute, supra note 5, Annex 1, art. 1(2)-(3) (granting the MICT
the authority to prosecute ICTY and ICTR cases). The MICT also has authority to hear
appeals from decisions rendered by the ICTY and ICTR. See id., Annex 2, art. 2(2).
245.
Three-judge Trial Chambers will adjudicate alleged violations of
international humanitarian law, with a majority vote required for conviction. See
MICT Statute, supranote 5, Annex 1, arts. 12(1), 21(2). In provisions strikingly akin to
Rule 15 bis, replacement judges may join part-heard cases with the consent of the
accused or by judicial override in "the interests of justice" when "a Judge of a Trial
Chamber is, for any reason, unable to continue sitting in a part-heard case" for long
duration. MICT RPE, supra note 166, R.19(C)-(D).
246.
Although the MICT may prosecute a less senior figure, it is only meant to
do so "after it has exhausted all reasonable efforts to refer the case" to a national
jurisdiction. MICT Statute, supra note 5, art. 1(3).
247.
As at the ICTY, the trials conducted by the MICT may-but need nothave a reserve judge appointed to be present at each stage of the trial. MICT RPE,
supra note 166, R.20(A).
248.
See MICT Statute, supra note 5, art. 18(1) (requiring that "the trial is fair
and expeditious and ... conducted in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence").
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to identify the "cut-off line" at which the interests of justice militate
against continuing a case with a replacement judge.
Better still, however, ICTY and ICTR precedent should serve to
incentivize the MICT to designate reserve judges for its trials. Indeed,
pragmatic considerations support the conclusion that this would be
sound practice for the MICT, particularly if it is to live up to the
expectations attendant to its role as "an exit strategy for
International Criminal Justice 2.0." 249 In effect, the MICT has
become operational with the accompanying intention that it will
efficiently bring its particular chapter of international criminal
justice, including its own operations, to an efficient end. Dependency
on replacement judges could pose serious hurdles to this aim. At a
bare minimum, the judge who joins a part-heard case will need time
to familiarize himself with the proceedings conducted in his absence.
In addition, it can almost certainly be expected that when a
replacement judge is introduced without consent, the accused will
exercise his automatic right to appeal the continuation of the trial.25 0
Designating a reserve judge, by contrast, would be consistent with
the MICT's efficiency mission.
Designating reserve judges could also prove beneficial to the
MICT in ways beyond these practical concerns. Like the Nuremberg
Tribunal before it, the mere act of incorporating an alternate judge in
the MICT proceedings could enhance its perceived fairness,
regardless of whether the judge's services end up being necessary. 25 1
Put plainly, given the harm sustained by the ICTY in relation to the
Segelj matter, the MICT's use of alternates could constitute a form of
damage control. While once it was thought that it would be
incumbent upon the MICT to strive to maintain the ICTY and ICTR's
"legacy and judicial integrity,"2 52 it instead seems that the MICT
could help to repair them. As the "last word" of the ICTY and ICTR,
the practice of the MICT should endeavor to fulfill this role, both
because doing so could help to revitalize the important contributions
otherwise made by these two important courts, and also because the
long-term support for the nascent international criminal justice
system depends in no small part upon how these parent institutions
are perceived.

249.
See Harold Hongju Koh, International Criminal Justice 5.0, 38 YALE J.
INT'L L. 525, 541 (2013).
MICT RPE, supra note 166, R.19 (D) ("If.. . the accused withholds his
250.
consent, the remaining Judges may nonetheless . .. continue the proceedings before a
Trial Chamber with a substitute Judge . . . . This decision is subject to appeal as of
right.").
251.
See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
252.
See Valerie Oosterveld, International Law and the Closure of the
International and Hybrid Criminal Tribunals, 104 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 37, 37
(2010).
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B. The Significance for the ICC
Just as distinctly, the experiences of the ICTY and ICTR ought
to prompt the ICC, which similarly employs three-judge trial panels
that render judgment by majority, 253 to ensure the presence of
judicial alternates for all its trials. Like the IMTFE before them, the
work of the ICTY and ICTR amply demonstrates that the loss of a
judge in the midst of lengthy, international criminal proceedings is a
predictable rather than anomalous event. This fact alone ought to
prompt the appointment of judicial alternates at the ICC, as the
Rome Statute appears to preclude the possibility of a new judge
replacing a member of a three-judge ICC Trial Chamber mid-trial. 254
Consequently, with ICC proceedings thus far averaging more than
three years in duration, 255 and no detained person accused of one of
the Court's core crimes yet successful in obtaining interim release, 256
the wisdom of appointing judicial alternates for ICC trials ought to be
strikingly apparent. Nevertheless, the ICC's President has yet to use
his discretionary authority to designate an alternate judge. 257 This
omission, and the ICC's only public discussion on the subject to date,
suggest that the ICC has thus far overlooked much if not all that can
be learned from ICTY and ICTR precedent.
1.

Designating an Alternate Judge

Prior to the commencement of the ICC's first trial, the
prosecution "encouraged the [Trial] Chamber to designate an

253.
See Rome Statute, supra note 6, arts. 39(2)(b)(ii), 74(3).
254.
As its first "[r]equirement] for [a] decision," the Statute dictates that "[a]ll
the judges of the Trial Chamber shall be present at each stage of the trial and
throughout their deliberations." Id. art. 74(1). This issue is discussed in greater detail
infra at notes 261-69 and accompanying text (suggesting that Tribunal judges are
often unable to complete trials due to death or illness).
255.
To date, the ICC has completed three trials, each of which lasted more than
three years from the commencement of the trial proceedings until the delivery of
judgment. See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06,
Jugement rendu en application de l'article 74 du Statut, ¶ 18 (Mar. 7, 2014) (noting
that the trial began on November 24, 2009); Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case
No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, T 10 (Mar. 14,
2012) (noting that the trial began on January 28, 2009); Prosecutor v. Mathieu
Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/12, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the
Statute, ¶ 19, (Dec. 18, 2012) (noting that the trial began on November 24, 2009).
Four individuals, charged solely with offenses against the administration of
256.
justice (the ICC equivalent of contempt of court) were recently granted release pending
trial. In the Case of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aime Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques
Mandenda Kabongo, Fiddle Babala Wandu & Narcisse Arido, Case No. ICC-01/0501/13-703, Decision Ordering the Release of Aim6 Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques
Mangenda Kabongo, Fiddle Babala Wandu and Narcisse Arido (Oct. 21, 2014).
257.
See Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 74(1) (granting the ICC president the
authority to, "on a case-by-case basis, designate, as available, one or more alternate
judges to be present at each stage of the trial").
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alternate judge as a precaution against one of the judges becoming
permanently unavailable." 25 8 Because this discretionary authority is
reserved for the President, however, the Trial Chamber opted to
consider the request in terms of whether it would recommend that
the President make such an appointment. In so doing, the Trial
Chamber also weighed in on what the pre-established procedure
should be for such appointments, 25 9 approving by majority a test
proposed by the prosecution. 260 The test includes two principal
considerations: (1) whether the ICC has the resources necessary to
make the appointment, "particularly in terms of a judge who is
available to attend the entirety of the trial," and (2) whether there is
"an identifiable risk that, for reasons such as the length of the trial,
or the personal circumstances of one or more of the judges, a member
of the bench may not be able to complete the trial." 261
Critically, the Trial Chamber then narrowly applied the second
prong of the test by considering whether any specific facts about the
case before it suggested that a judge might be lost mid-trial. 262 By
limiting its consideration to this restrictive class of risks, the
Chamber overlooked the ICTY and ICTR experience, which suggests
that in many cases, if not most, future threats to judicial composition
will be unknown at the start of a trial. Indeed, given the
requirements of independence and impartiality, when a trial
commences there should never be an identifiable risk that a trial
panel member will later be disqualified for the apprehension of bias,
like in the degelj matter. However, that event cannot properly be
casually dismissed as aberrational. In fact, at least one ICTR matter

258.
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01-/04-01/06, Decision
on Whether Two Judges Alone May Hold a Hearing and Recommendations to the
Presidency on Whether an Alternate Judge Should Be Assigned for the Trial, 1 5 (May
22, 2008) [hereinafter Lubanga, Recommendation on the Assignment of an Alternate
Judge].
259.
The ICC Rules provide that "[a]lternate judges shall be designated in
accordance with a procedure pre-established by the Court." Rules of Procedure and
Evidence of the International Criminal Court, R. 39, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3 (Part II-A)
(2013) [hereinafter ICC RPE], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/legaltexts/RulesProcedureEvidenceEng.pdf [http://perma.cc/FS4Q-GNCQ] (archived Oct. 24,
2014).
260.
See Lubanga, Recommendation on the Assignment of an Alternate Judge,
supra note 257, 1 17. Because the authority for appointing an alternate judge is
allocated to the ICC President, Judge Blattmann concluded that the matter was "not
within [the Trial Chamber's] competency." Id. Separate and Concurring Opinion of
Judge Blattman, ¶ 11.
261.
Lubanga, Recommendation on the Assignment of an Alternate Judge,
supra note 258, ¶ 17.
262.
See Lubanga, Recommendation on the Assignment of an Alternate Judge,
supra note 258, 1 19 (considering the scope of the evidence and whether the trial was
likely to be lengthy).
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also resulted in the mid-trial loss of a judge due to allegations of
bias. 263
What is more, ICTY and ICTR precedent is replete with
examples of sudden, mid-trial departures resulting from sudden and
severe ill health or the unexpected death of a judge, including that of
the presiding judge in the Milosevic matter. 264 Perhaps the most
common cause of loss at the ICTY and ICTR, events of this type are
both undetectable and ubiquitous. Indeed, the ICC has already
experienced the surprise death of one of its judges at the age of 65,265
just after she was elected to a nine-year term, 26 6 and mere months
before her designated Trial Chamber began to hear the Katanga and
Chui case. 2 67
This leads to the question of whether the age of a Trial Chamber
member does (or should) constitute an "identifiable risk" of later
unavailability. Much suggests that the answer to this question ought
to be "yes," perhaps most particularly that "[j]udges at the
international criminal courts have usually been of a rather advanced
age." 268 In fact, the ICTY was specifically criticized for not taking the

263.
In the Karemera case, then-Presiding Judge Vaz opted to recuse herself
from the on-going trial under the shadow of a defence motion to disqualify her "on the
basis of an alleged association between the Judge and a member of the Prosecution
team working on the case." Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR-98-44-Al5bis,
Decision in the Matter of Proceedings under Rule 15 BIS(D), ¶ 3 (June 21, 2004). The
ICTR reported that "[tlhe decision [to withdraw] was made in order to dispel any
possible doubt about the integrity of the proceedings." Press Release, International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Presiding Judge Withdraws from Karamera et al. Case,
ICTR Press Release ICTR/INFO-9-2-390.EN (May 18, 2004), available at http://
www.unictr.org/tabid/155/Default.aspx?ID=207 [http://perma.cc/T89F-EADZ] (archived
Sept. 30, 2014).
264.
Judge May's unexpected resignation in the midst of the Milosevic due to the
rapid onset of a grave "illness clearly upset members of the [Tribunal's] staff." Simons,
Milosevic Judge Resigns, supra note 69. At the ICTR, Judge Kama's mid-trial death
was a "tremendous shock." See Rwanda Tribunal Staff and Judges Pay Tribute to
Former President Kama, HIRONDELLE NEWS AGENCY (May 7, 2001), http://www
.hirondellenews.comlictr-rwanda/404-ictr-institutional-news/18000-en-en-rwanda-tribunalstaff-and-judges-pay-tribute-to-former-president-kama70517051 [http/perma.ceINA3Z-BQL6]
(archived Sept. 30, 2014) (quoting then-ICTR President Navanethem Pillay).
265.
ICC Judge Fumiko Saiga, 65, who "died suddenly of a heart attack." Afua
Hirsch, Study Condemns 'Toxic' System of Appointing Judges, IRISH TIMES (Sept. 9,
2010) (subscription required).
266.
See Press Release, International Criminal Court, Passing of Judge Fumiko
Saiga, ICC Press Release ICC-CPI-200904240PR407 (Apr. 24, 2009), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/enmenus/asp/press%20releases/press%20releases%202009/
Pages/passing%20of%20judge%20fumiko%20saiga.aspx
[http://perma.cc/AK9B-HPCG]
(archived Oct. 28, 2014) (indicating that Judge Saiga was re-elected to the ICC in
January 2009, four months before her death).
267.
Prosecutor v. Katanga & Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision
Replacing a Judge in Trial Chamber II (Apr. 29, 2009) (indicating that Judge HansPeter Kaul would replace Judge Fumiko Saiga just six months after the judges were
appointed to Trial Chamber II).
268.
See Alette Smeulers, B. Hola & T. van den Berg, Sixty-Five Years of
International Criminal Justice: The Facts and Figures, 13 INT'L CRIM. L. REV. 7, 13
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factor into account before Judge May, at age 65, became unable to
complete the Milosevic trial. For one critic, the Tribunal's failure to
have provided for an alternate judge in that high profile case was
"inexcusable" in part due to "the age of the judges." 269 Remarkably,
concern about the anticipated age of future ICC judges was present
when the Rome Statute was being drafted, as is evidenced by a
proposal (later defeated) "that a judge could not be over the age of 65
at the time of election." 270
Notwithstanding this history, the Lubanga Trial Chamber at the
ICC apparently concluded that judicial age does not constitute an
identifiable risk in deciding whether to designate an alternate judge.
Rather, the Trial Chamber pronounced that there were "no known
personal circumstances relating to any of the judges which raise any
concerns that one of [sic] more of them will be unable to complete this
trial," 2 71 although one of its number was then nearly 69. This
suggests further problems with the proposed test, as it seems likely
that future judges and, similarly, the ICC President, will be
disinclined to acknowledge advanced age as an identifiable risk. This
can only spell trouble for the ICC where, as of May 2012, the average
judicial age was 62 and the oldest serving member 81.272
Finally, even when there are risks that militate in favor of
designating an alternate, the resource-based aspect of the
recommended test may nevertheless preclude the appointment. In
effect, this prong of the test prompts the ICC to follow ICTY and
ICTR precedent rather than learn from it. Indeed, if the analysis in
the Lubanga decision provides a workable frame of reference for what
the future holds, the ICC may never have the necessary "availability"
of resources for a judicial alternate. In Lubanga, the first-and at
that time only-ICC trial, the Trial Chamber appeared to cast doubt
as to whether the numerous judges available to serve as alternates
constituted adequate resources, by noting that the impending start of
the ICC's second trial could create "significant competing judicial
commitments" for some of the would-be alternates. 27 3 In light of that

(2013) (positing that this may be attributed to the requirements for such positions,
including extensive professional experience).
269.
Scharf, supra note 49, at 39.
270.
Medard R. Rwelamira, Composition and Administration of the Court, in
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE: ISSUES,

NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 153, 157 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999) (noting that the proposal was
rejected as arbitrary and unsupported by domestic and international practice).
271.
Lubanga, Recommendation on the Assignment of an Alternate Judge,
supra note 258, 1 20.
272.
Smeulers, Hola & van den Berg, supra note 268, at 14 tbl.2 (showing age
distribution for all major international criminal tribunals).
273.
See Lubanga, Recommendation on the Assignment of an Alternate Judge,
supra note 258, 1 21.
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observation, and given the ICC's now burgeoning caseload, 274 it is

perhaps of little surprise that not a single alternate judge has been
appointed to date.
In sum, these observations suggest that, unless changes are
made, it is only a matter of time before an ICC Trial Chamber is
rendered incomplete mid-trial. Indeed, this seems the natural
outcome of applying a procedure for designating alternate judges
that, unmindful of ICTY and ICTR precedent, is limited to known
risks and invites-or at least allows-judicial age to be excluded from
the risk analysis. What is more, by making it possible for resource
considerations to trump identified risks, the procedure enhances the
likelihood that those trials most needing of judicial alternates will
nevertheless be undertaken without one. These factors, considered
alongside the ICC President's thus far persistent failure to designate
judicial alternates for ICC trials, indicate that the ICC is nearly
destined to have one of its future trials come to an abrupt halt upon
losing a Trial Chamber member. This prompts the question of how
the ICC can-and should-handle the mid-trial loss of a judge in
cases where an alternate has not been appointed.
2.

Does the Rome Statute Permit Mid-trial Judicial Replacements?

Concern regarding how the ICC could address the problems
created when a judge is lost mid-trial, when no alternate has been
appointed, animated the discussions that accompanied the drafting of
the ICC Rules. To that end, Denmark proposed a provision that
authorized the ICC President to appoint an alternate mid-trial for the
purpose of either continuing the trial or holding a rehearing. 275
Similar to early ICTY practice in this regard, the proposal further
provided that continuing the proceeding with the unfamiliar
replacement would require "the consent of the accused and the
Prosecutor." 276 This aspect of the Danish proposal failed, however,
because of its apparent incompatibility with the Court's Statute.2 7 7
The conflict presented involves Article 74 of the Rome Statute
which provides that, as a requirement for a decision, "[a]ll the judges
of the Trial Chamber shall be present at each stage of the trial and

274.
To date, "21 cases in 9 situations have been brought before the ... Court."
Situations and Cases, INT'L CRIM. CT., http://www.icc-cpi.int/en-menus/icc/situations
%20and%20cases[Pages/situations%20and%20cases.aspx
[http://perma.cc/BV3L-HHJQ
(archived Sept. 30, 2014).
275.
See Socorro Flores Liera, Single Judge, Replacements, and Alternate
Judges, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND RULES OF

PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 310, 313-14 (Roy S. Lee ed., 2001). Because "there were
doubts as to whether [that aspect of] the Danish proposal was fully-compatible with the
Statute[,] . . . it was decided not to retain it in the final text of Rule 39."
276.
Id. at 313.
277.
See id. at 313-14 (indicating that the effort was unsuccessful because it
"intended to address an issue that the Statute already regulated in a different form").
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throughout their deliberations."2 7 8 At further odds with the Danish
proposal, Article 74 also requires that, when designated, the alternate
judge's presence is likewise required "at each stage of the trial."2 79
Properly applied, then, these provisions dictate that a trial "can,
consequently, not be completed if one of the members falls out and no
alternate judge has been designated." 280
Yet, with the ICC budget already stretched thin and donor
countries reluctant to give more,2 81 restarting a costly and timeconsuming international trial would likely have a devastating effect
on the Court. Consequently it will be of little surprise if, when the
times comes, the option of replacing a lost judge with one who has not
previously attended the trial is mooted, despite the fact that such a
replacement "seems impossible"2 8 2 under the Rome Statute.2 8 3
Here, the e§elj matter ought to prove instructive. Before even
contemplating a move that seems an obvious violation of statutory
command, the ICC would do well to remember the damage wrought
when the ICTY engaged in comparable conduct. Maligned before it
even commenced its first trial for its alleged "unchecked judicial
power," 284 it would hardly become the ICC to ignore the Statute's
express constraints on its conduct. Like the ICTY before it, the ICC
can expect that infidelity to its own requirements-in particular
because these derive from a treaty forged by the states that created
the Court-is all but certain to undermine the ICC's emerging

278.
Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 74(1).
279.
Id. The ICC Rules further clarify that the Alternate Judge shall also sit
through the deliberations on the case although he may not take part unless and until
required to serve as a replacement. ICC RPE, supranote 259, R.39.
280.
HAkan Friman, ProceduralLaw of the Criminal Court - An Introduction, in
2 ESSAYS ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 201, 226

(Flavia Lattanzi & William A. Schabas eds., 2003).
281.
See, e.g., Lilian Ochieng & Simon Jennings, ICC Secures Budget Increase,
INST. FOR WAR & PEACE REPORTING (Jan. 20, 2014), http://iwpr.net/report-news/icesecures-budget-increase [http://perma.cc/7MY9-STZX] (archived Sept. 30, 2014) (noting
that, although the Assembly of States Parties agreed to an increase in the Court's
budget, the approved funds fall short of the request by more than four million euros
and at least one state has already suggested it will lobby for zero-growth in 2015).
282.
William A. Schabas, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY
ON THE ROME STATUTE 1105 (2010).

283.
Indeed, states may have even been sensitive to this fact back when the ICC
Rules were being drafted. Rather than dispositively reject the Danish proposal noted
above as strikingly at odds with the relatively clear language of Article 74(1), instead
"there were doubts as to whether [it] was fully-compatible with the Statute." Flores
Liera, supra note 275, at 313-14.
284.
John R. Bolton, Under Sec'y for Arms Control & Int'l Sec., Remarks to the
Federalist Society: The United States and the International Criminal Court (Nov. 14,
2002), available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/t/us/rm/15158.htm [http://perma.cclS9K2DFU8] (archived Sept. 30, 2014) (arguing that the United States should not support
the ICC because the ICC has "unchecked judicial power," which is unconstitutional).
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reputation while legitimizing the arguments of its opponents and
driving a wedge between the ICC and some of its supporters.

IX. CONCLUSION

The decision to create the ICTY and ICTR without the protection
that alternate judges provide was reckless at best. As the precedent
from Nuremberg and Tokyo made plain, administering justice in the
presence of judicial alternates enhances the perceived fairness of
international criminal proceedings, while operating in their absence
is apt to lead to objectionable results. The ABA's 1993 Special Task
Force further emphasized the important role that alternates serve
before the ICTY even became operational, cautioning the UN Security
Council that because the ICTY should have "every reasonable
structural and procedural guarantee of impartiality," it needed to
have multiple alternate judges. 28 5 Nevertheless, the UN Security
Council appeared more focused on what these judicial figures would
cost rather than the benefit they could bring to ICTY proceedings.
This set the tone for the years that followed, with a fair portion
of the blame for the ICTY and ICTR's increasingly questionable use of
replacement judges directly attributable to ever-growing, external
pressures to make their proceedings quicker and more cost-effective.
The wake-up call for all involved, however, ought to have come with
the Milosevic proceedings, when the late-trial imposition of a new
judge raised legitimate doubts about the ICTY's integrity. 28 6 In
considering the critiques following that high profile trial, the ICTY
should have listened, in particular, to the admonishment that "a war
crimes tribunal should appoint at least one alternate judge who
observes the trial from its commencement." 28 7
The combined response from the ICTY and the UN Security
Council, however, suggests that they only half-heard what was being
said. Although finally prompted to incorporate judicial alternates into
ICTY practice, ever-prevalent cost concerns tempered the reform
attempt, resulting in a rule that made the appointment of reserve
judges discretionary. As a consequence, proceedings remained
vulnerable to a repeat of events like those in the Milosevic case or,
worse still, the loss of an essential judge at an even later stage in the
proceedings, as in Selelj.
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Indeed, had an alternate been required in the Segelj case, the
relatively seamless continuation in proceedings would likely have
proven to be little more than of passing academic interest. Instead, in
its scramble to attempt to rescue the years-long prosecution, the
ICTY demonstrated a profound faithlessness to its rules that
attracted unwelcome attention, empowered its critics, and distanced
its allies. Plainly speaking, the taint of the decision to import a new
judge post-trial is likely to linger well beyond the ICTY's imminent
closure. As the ICTY prepares to close its doors then, it seems likely
that, in the words of the former Chief Prosecutor at Nuremberg, ICTY
and ICTR actors will need to be "consoled by the fact that in
proceedings of this novelty, errors and missteps may. . . be
instructive to the future."2 88
As this Article demonstrates, these lessons ought to bear
immediate significance for the MICT. Tasked with continuing and
concluding the important work of the ICTY and ICTR, the MICT
would do well to ensure that it does not retrace their errors and
missteps. At a minimum, the MICT should faithfully adhere to its
statutory and rules-based obligations. More strategically, however,
the MICT could and should ensure that ICTY and ICTR work ends on
a high note by affording all accused persons tried before it the
procedural safeguard of an alternate judge. Consistent with the
mission to bring its phase of international criminal justice to an
efficient end, the move would ensure that MICT practice is not
delayed in order for substitute judges to learn about the proceedings
conducted in their absence, witnesses to be recalled, or substitutionrelated appeals to be heard. Of comparable or perhaps even greater
importance, by concluding the work of the ICTY and ICTR in a way
that prioritizes fairness over cost, the MICT could enhance the longterm perception of the ICTY and ICTR while setting an important
precedent within the still-developing framework of international
criminal justice.
Finally, ICTY and ICTR practice makes an even more compelling
case for the liberal designation of alternate judges at the ICC. As
ICTY and ICTR practice makes clear, the ICC should expect that a
certain number of its trial judges will need to be replaced mid-trial for
unexpected reasons. This fact, coupled with the ICC's failure to
designate even a single alternate judge to date, suggests that it is
only a matter of time before an expensive and time-consuming ICC
prosecution comes to an abrupt halt. At that stage, the ICC will be
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faced with an unhappy alternative of either repeating the mistakes in
Selelj or commencing a costly and time-consuming rehearing.
In order to avoid these unattractive options, the ICC ought to
seize the opportunity to learn from the precedent set by the ICTY and
ICTR. In so doing, with some cost and otherwise little effort, the ICC
will be able to avoid many of the reputational hits sustained by these
slightly older institutions while delivering a more efficient version of
justice. Indeed, inasmuch as the ICTY and ICTR's problems with
replacement judges stem from a failure to incorporate into their
practice the lessons from Nuremberg and Tokyo, it would be beyond
regrettable if the ICC were to replicate that error by overlooking all
that can be learned from the experience of the ICTY and ICTR.

